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ABSTRACT: Over twenty years ago, Susan Brownmiller stressed the need to
"get[] a grip on the corset" when considering femininity. In patent law, the
"corset case," Egbert v. Lippmann (1881), is a canonical case explicating the
public use doctrine. Using a historical exploration of Egbert, this paper seeks
to "get[] a grip" on the corset as part of the burgeoning project to consider the
intersections of gender and intellectual property from a feminist perspective.
The corset achieved the pinnacle of its use by American women during the
decades between the Civil War and the turn of the twentieth century. It was
both the near-constant companion of the vast majority of women in the United
States and a technological wonder. Like the more celebrated technologies of the
era, such as the telephone, the telegraph, and the light bulb, the corset was the
product of many inventors, who made and patented improvements and fought
about their rights in court. As American women donned their corsets, they had
a daily intimate relationship with a heavily patent-protected technology. The
corset was deeply embedded both within the social construction of gender and
sexuality as a marker of femininity and respectability, and within the United
States patent system, as a commercial good in which many claimed intellectual
property rights. Getting a grip on the corset, then, offers a way to
simultaneously consider gender, sexuality, and patent law.
After a consideration of what it means to make a feminist analysis of patent
law in Part I, in Part II, I detail the history of the corset as an invention, using
patent records, published opinions, and archival court records. Part III situates
this little-known history against the existing historical understanding of the
corset as it reinforced gender roles, policed the boundary between public and
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private, and served in court as a witness to women's sexual activities. Part IV
contains an archivally based excavation of the much-cited and foundational
Supreme Court decision, Egbert v. Lippmann, in which a patent to an
improvement in corsetry was at stake. In Part V, I use the accumulated
understandings of the corset as technology, garment, and object of legal
scrutiny to get a grip on the corset in patent law.
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Getting a Grip on the Corset
"[N]o discussion of the feminine body in the Western world can make
much sense without getting a grip on the corset, . . . for the corset has
played ... a starring role in the body's history."
-Susan Brownmiller, Femininity (1984)1
"The inventor slept on his rights for eleven years."
-Justice Woods, Egbert v. Lippmann (1881)2
Over twenty years ago, Susan Brownmiller stressed the need to "get[] a
grip on the corset" when considering femininity. As activists in the women's
liberation movement, Brownmiller and other women had rejected bras and
girdles as a political act.3  She considered the predecessor to these body-
shaping garments, the corset, crucial to her gender analysis of contemporary
society.4 By the time Brownmiller wrote her analysis of late twentieth-century
femininity, the corset's heyday was long past. The corset achieved the pinnacle
of its "starring role" in the history of American femininity during the decades
between the Civil War and the turn of the twentieth century. in those decades,
the corset was the near-constant companion of most women in the United
States, from children to the elderly, from the working classes to the upper
classes. According to historian Leigh Summers, the corset was "a phenomenon
that swept England and America between 1860 and 1900." The corset created
the public figure of femininity.
The late-nineteenth-century corset was also a technological wonder. The
corset was an intricate structure, reinforced with bone and steel. Its ability to
mold women's bodies into an hourglass shape was dependent on technologies
of the Industrial Revolution-from metal eyelets, to the sewing machine, to the
steam engine.6 Like the more celebrated technologies of the era, such as the
telephone, the telegraph, and the light bulb, the corset was the product of many
inventors, who made and patented improvements and fought about their rights
1. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY 35 (1984).
2. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881).
3. For Brownmiller's account of the women's liberation movement, see SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN
OUR TIME: MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION (1999). Her discussion of the more relaxed undergarments of
the 1960s, which allowed her "to breathe normally for the first time since high school," is at 4. Her
discussion of the "Freedom Trash Can," into which women discarded bras and girdles (as well as high-
heeled shoes and eyelash curlers) at the protest of the Miss America pageant in 1968, is at 37-39.
4. Brownmiller was not the first to consider the corset as an aspect of the patriarchal subjugation of
women. See, e.g., Helene E. Roberts, The Exquisite Slave: Clothes in the Making of the Victorian
Woman, 2 SIGNS 554 (1977).
5. LEIGH SUMMERS, BOUND To PLEASE: A HISTORY OF THE VICTORIAN CORSET 63 (2003). For
the ubiquity of the garment across age and class, see VALERIE STEELE, THE CORSET: A CULTURAL
HISTORY 35-36 (2001), and SUMMERS, supra, at4, 8-9.
6. The industrialization of corset manufacture is described in Bernard Smith, Market Development,
Industrial Development: The Case of the American Corset Trade, 1860-1920, 65 Bus. HIST. REV. 91
(1991).
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in court. As American women donned their corsets, they were enacting a daily
intimate relationship with a heavily patent-protected technology. The corset
during these decades was deeply embedded both within the social construction
of gender and sexuality, as a marker of femininity and respectability, and
within the United States patent system, as a commercial good in which many
claimed intellectual property rights.
Getting a grip on the corset, then, offers a way to simultaneously consider
gender, sexuality, and patent law as part of the burgeoning project to analyze
intellectual property from a feminist perspective. 7 The admonition to get a grip
on the corset is particularly relevant to this project because in addition to its
"starring role" in the history of the Western feminine body, the corset has also
played a starring role in the canon of patent law. In 1881, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Egbert v. Lippmann, declaring that a corset patent owned
by the plaintiff, Frances Egbert, was invalid.8 Since then, Egbert has been
recognized and repeatedly cited for its foundational explication of the "public
use" doctrine in patent law.9 Reiterating over a century of reliance on the case,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2005 cited Egbert as "the
classical standard for assessing the public nature of a use."' 0 The Supreme
Court's opinion is excerpted in virtually every patent casebook today to explain
the public use doctrine." Anyone who has taught or taken patent law is nearly
certain to remember what is commonly referred to as the "corset case."
Despite its established position in the canon, the Egbert decision appeared
odd when it was issued, and it is an oddity today. This oddity arises in part
because the Court used a case about underwear to explain the parameters of the
public use of an invention. The Court found that one woman's use of an
7. Only within the last decade has the absence of scholarship in this area been noted. This omission
has begun to be remedied in recent years, particularly through the annual IP/Gender Symposium at
American University School of Law, first held in 2004. Peter Jaszi, Opening Remarks, 15 Am. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 177, 177-78 (2007).
8. 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881).
9. Egbert has been continually cited from its issuance to the present for its interpretation of the
public use bar to patenting, with nearly two hundred citations in opinions published across every
intervening decade. See, e.g., Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 20 (1939); Hall v.
Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 97 (1883); Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370-71
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re
Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134-36 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Nicholson v. Carl W. Mullis Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 315
F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1963); Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1946); Wendell v. Am. Laundry Mach. Co., 248 F. 698, 700 (3d Cir. 1918).
10. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Kevin
M. Drucker, Bars to Patentability, 41 ARIZ. Arr'Y 22, 23 (Jan. 2005) ("classic case"); Note, Prior Art in
the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 369, 381 (1959) ("leading case").
11. See, e.g., F. ScOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw, 341-44 (4th ed. 2008); ROBERT
P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS, 522-27 (4th ed.
2007); CRAIG ALLAN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 279-82 (2008). The case is considered so basic that
it is also included in intellectual property survey casebooks. See, e.g., SHUBHA GHOSH ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF
CREATIVE ACTIVITY 284-87 (2007); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 220-22 (5th ed. 2010).
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improved steel stiffener within her corset was a public use of the
improvement.12 By this ruling, this most private garment was made legally
public. This odd aspect of Egbert was noted by the dissenting Justice at the
time,13 and it remains a startling feature of the case when it is used to introduce
the public use doctrine to contemporary law students. The case also seems odd
in the early twenty-first century because it involves a female patent owner as
plaintiff and a feminine garment as the disputed technology, both rare within
the patent law canon. The plaintiff Frances Egbert, her corset, and her corset
patent all appear exotic in the context of a standard patent law course, which
involves "hard," that is, masculine, technologies such as auto parts, chemicals,
airplanes, and light bulbs, and a steady parade of male inventors and male
litigants.14 The oddities of the Egbert decision provide rich opportunities for a
feminist analysis of patent law. By paying careful attention to gender and
sexuality while considering the nineteenth-century corset as invention, we can
understand the oddness of Egbert, both to its nineteenth-century participants
and to its twenty-first-century readers.
Replacing oddity with understanding requires taking seriously the
realization that patents and patent law, like other areas of intellectual property
law, and like the law generally, exist within a gendered set of knowledges
about men and women, including what they make and do and how they interact
in commercial settings, in domestic settings, in courtrooms, and in intimate
relationships. This Article addresses this challenge by examining the corset as
patented technology and by re-considering Egbert v. Lippmann and the public
use doctrine as a case study in the gendered nature of patent law. After a
consideration in Part I of what it means to attempt a feminist analysis of patent
law by getting a grip on the corset, in Part III detail the history of the corset as
invention, using patent records, published opinions, and archival court records.
Part III situates this little-known history against the existing historical
understanding of the corset as an aspect of female fashion that reinforced
gender roles, and uncovers the role of the corset in the courtroom as a witness
to women's sexual activities. Part IV contains an archivally based excavation
of Egbert v. Lippmann. In Part V, I use the accumulated understandings of the
12. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337.
13. Id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting).
14. Men predominate as actors in patent law casebooks, a fact which may be interpreted in various
ways depending on the perspective of the reader. See Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A
Feminist Analysis ofa Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
15. The few existing considerations of the corset as patented technology include brief discussions
in the popular history, HOAG LEVINS, AMERICAN SEX MACHINES: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF SEX AT THE
U.S. PATENT OFFICE 149-52 (1996), as well as in histories of women inventors. See B. ZORINA KHAN,
The DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 144-46 (2005); B. Zorina Khan, "Not for Ornament": Patenting Activity
by Nineteenth-Century Women Inventors, 31 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 159, 177 (2000); Deborah J.
Merritt, Hypatia in the Patent Office: Women Inventors and the Law, 1865-1900, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
235, 245-46 (1991).
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corset as technology, garment, and object of legal scrutiny to get a grip on the
corset in patent law, making a feminist analysis of the "public use" doctrine as
defined in Egbert.
PART I. TOWARD A FEMINIST APPROACH TO PATENT LAW
Because there is so little scholarship engaged in feminist analysis of patent
law, I begin with a brief discussion of what such analysis might entail,
acknowledging that feminist thought is a collection of analytic approaches, and
that any feminist analysis is only one of many such analyses that might be
made. 16
A. Identifying the Tools
Less than a decade ago, Peter Jaszi described the general consensus that
gender studies and intellectual property scholarship lacked any connections
whatsoever. In response, scholars have begun to consider the broad project of
feminist interpretations of intellectual property, and to "map[] the connections"
between gender and forms of intellectual property.' This project has not been
limited in its understanding of what such feminist analysis might be, although it
has particularly invited consideration of gender. I join the project from this
perspective, adding sexuality to gender as another key analytic focus. I also
appreciate the reminder of Dan Burk, an early contributor to this project, that
"feminist inquiry is fundamentally about determining who has power and how
it is being used."19
16. Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 431, 432-33 (2006) (acknowledging "multiple feminisms"); Judith A. McGaw, No Passive
Victims, No Separate Spheres: A Feminist Perspective on Technology's History, in IN CONTEXT:
HISTORY AND THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 172 (Stephen H. Cutcliffe & Robert C. Post eds., 1989)
(claiming only "a feminist perspective").
17. Jaszi, supra note 7, at 177-78.
18. "Mapping the Connections" has been the subtitle of the IP/Gender symposia. See supra note 7.
For examples of scholarship in this area, see, for example, Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex:
Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 551 (2006) [hereinafter
Bartow, Fair Use]; Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 776-92 (2004)
[hereinafter, Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion]; Emily Chaloner, A Story of Her Own: A Feminist
Critique of Copyright Law, 6 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 221 (2010); Cary Craig,
Reconstructing the Author-Self? Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 207 (2007); K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection ofRace and Gender: Lady
Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 365 (2008); Halbert, supra note 16; Eileen Kane,
Molecules and Conflict: Cancer, Patents, and Women's Health, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
305 (2007); Malla Pollack, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered
Scope of United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
603 (2006); and Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 273 (2007).
19. Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y
& L. 183, 185 (2007) [hereinafter Burk, Feminism and Dualism]. Burk has been an ongoing organizer
of the IP/Gender symposia and a frequent contributor to this scholarly project. See also Dan L. Burk,
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To date, feminist interpretations of intellectual property law have focused
primarily on copyright. 2 0 The development of a feminist scholarship of patent
law has proven slower to emerge, 21 although Burk has begun the conversation
by suggesting a set of connections between feminist critiques of powerful
sociocultural dualisms-mind/body and nature/culture-and the reliance on
22these dualisms in both patent and copyright law. Burk and others have also
noted the fruitful links between feminist epistemologies and the constant
struggle within intellectual property law to define knowledge. 23 The analysis in
this article draws upon both these categories of feminist thought, that is, upon
feminist sociology of knowledge and feminist critiques of dualism as sites of
the creation of power inequalities. It also draws upon a few other resources,
which I have found particularly useful in considering a feminist approach to
patent law, and which I briefly describe here.
First, there exists a feminist literature about women and invention that
spans the last century. While less than one percent of all patents issued during
24the nineteenth century were granted to women, by the late nineteenth century,
feminists had begun pushing for the recognition of those women. At their
urging, the United States Patent Office published several listings of women
inventors between 1888 and 1895, attempting to catalogue all patents issued to
25
women since 1790. At both the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in
1876 and the World's Columbian Exhibition in Chicago in 1893, women
inventors received special notice, with a Woman's Pavilion in Chicago
26
prominently displaying inventions by women. These early efforts to connect
invention and feminist goals such as women's equality and economic self-
sufficiency have been enhanced in recent decades by scholarly efforts to
Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 519 (2006)
[hereinafter Burk, Copyright and Feminism]; Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender? (U.C. Irvine Sch.
of Law Research Paper No. 2010-17, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1652873 [hereinafter
Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?].
20. For examples of the feminist analysis of copyright law, see Bartow, Fair Use, supra note 18;
Burk, Copyright and Feminism, supra note 19; Craig, supra note 18; Tushnet, supra note 18.
21. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, supra note 19, at 3 (describing feminist patent scholarship as
"almost unheard of').
22. Burk, Feminism and Dualism, supra note 19.
23. Id.; Halbert, supra note 16, at 438-47.
24. KHAN, supra note 15, at 135.
25. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, WOMEN INVENTORS TO WHOM PATENTS HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1790 TO JULY 1, 1888 (1888); U.S. PATENT OFFICE, WOMEN INVENTORS
TO WHOM PATENTS HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1790 TO JULY 1, 1888
TO OCTOBER 1, 1892 App. No. 1 (1892); U.S. PATENT OFFICE, WOMEN INVENTORS TO WHOM PATENTS
HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OCTOBER 1, 1892 TO MARCH 1, 1895
APP. No. 2 (1895).
26. See generally DENISE E. PILATO, RETRIEVAL OF A LEGACY: NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICAN WOMEN INVENTORS 141-72 (2000); Deborah Jean Warner, Women Inventors at the
Centennial, in DYNAMOS AND VIRGINS REVISITED: WOMEN AND TECHNOLOGY CHANGE IN HISTORY
102-19 (Martha Moore Trescott ed., 1979); Mary F. Cordato, Representing the Expansion of Woman's
Sphere: Women's Work and Culture at the World's Fairs of 1876, 1893, and 1904 (1989) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with Univ. Microfilms Int'l).
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catalogue female inventors (the government lists have been shown to be
27incomplete), to understand the women who did seek patents, and to examine
the various legal, social, financial, and educational barriers which have kept
female participation in the patent system low.28 Given the contemporary
concern with attracting workers into science and technology, understanding
barriers to female participation in these activities is of ongoing interest, and
scholarship focusing on women's participation in invention and patenting in the
early twenty-first century is increasing.29
As the work already done in copyright law exemplifies, however, feminist
analysis of intellectual property includes, but is not limited to, tracing the
participation of women in formal systems of intellectual property. It also
encourages asking questions about gender and sexuality that lead beyond a
consideration of women as actors into a consideration of both masculinity and
femininity and of heteronormativity in the doctrines and processes of
intellectual property. Here, the project of connecting gender studies and
intellectual property can draw upon feminist historians of technology, who,
while not explicitly dealing with inventions or patents, have been attempting to
rethink the history of technology by asking this very class of questions.3 0
The relative absence of scholarship that considers issues of gender and
sexuality in patent doctrine can be explained in part by the pervasive and
abiding perception of science and technology as uniquely fact-based, and thus
gender-neutral. 1 About thirty years ago, feminist scholars noted that this
perception had pervaded not only popular notions but also the historiography of
science and technology. Using the feminist insight that knowledge itself can be
gendered, a feminist critique has since emerged, arguing that science and
technology themselves are gendered, not just in the ways in which they are
27. Autumn Stanley, The Patent Clerk as Conjurer: The Vanishing Lady Trick in a l9th-Century
Historical Source, in WOMEN, WORK, AND TECHNOLOGY: TRANSFORMATIONS 118 (Barbara Drygulski
Wright et al. eds., 1987).
28. See KHAN, supra note 15; ANNE L. MACDONALD, FEMININE INGENUITY: WOMEN AND
INVENTION IN AMERICA (1992); PILATO, supra note 26; AUTUMN STANLEY, MOTHERS AND DAUGHTERS
OF INVENTION: NOTES FOR A REVISED HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (1993); ETHLIE ANN VARE & GREG
PTACEK, MOTHERS OF INVENTION: FROM THE BRA TO THE BOMB (1988); ETHLE ANN VARE & GREG
PTACEK, PATENTLY FEMALE: FROM AZT To TV DINNERS (2002); Khan, supra note 15; Merritt, supra
note 15.
29. See, for example, the following papers presented at the seventh Annual IP/Gender Symposium,
American University Washington College of Law, April 2010: Bernardita Escobar, Women and Science
Production in Developing Countries: Chile in the 1990-2008 Period; Annette I. Kahler, Examining the
Right To Exclude: Historical, Social and Economic Perspectives on Women and Invention; and Shlomit
Yanisky Ravid, Patents and Gender: The Exclusion of Women Inventors from IP Rights.
30. For a discussion of the goals and challenges of this type of feminist history of technology, see
Nina E. Lerman, Categories of Difference, Categories of Power: Bringing Gender and Race to the
History of Technology, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 893, 895-904 (2010); and McGaw, supra note 16.
31. As pointed out in Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, supra note 18, at 776 n. 195 (discussing
Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral
Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (2002)), the perception of intellectual property law as gender-
neutral is also linked to the perception of commercial law as gender-neutral.
64 [Vol. 23:57
Getting a Grip on the Corset
performed differently by men and women-and are most often performed by
men-but also in the knowledge and objects created by these performances. 32
Feminist historians of technology have analyzed mundane aspects of women's
lives as part of the history of technology, combining consideration of gender
roles within the factories of the industrializing United States with consideration
of traditionally feminine technologies like irons and sewing implements and the
technologies used in daily household tasks.33 This literature is thus a second
resource for the development of a feminist analysis of patent law.
B. Starting with the Corset
One could roughly characterize these two sets of literatures I have just
identified by their methodology: the first follows the women, and the second
follows the technology. These approaches, however, need not be mutually
exclusive. A pioneering feminist historian of technology, Judith McGaw,
herself borrowing from a feminist philosopher of science, has noted that to take
a feminist perspective requires consideration "of women and their actual
experiences" and "of those domains of experience that have been relegated to
women: namely, the personal, the emotional, and the sexual."34 By choosing
the corset as a starting point for a feminist analysis of patent law, I am slanting
my project toward following the technology. In the following pages, I follow
the corset in and out of the patent office, factories, small workshops, parlors,
bedrooms, and the courtroom. But considering the corset as patented
technology provides an opportunity to combine both methodological
approaches, and also follow women. The corset as a material object was part of
the lived experience of women in these decades, a mundane feature of their
lives that controlled how they walked, sat, worked, and danced. To the extent
that the historical record allows, I have attempted to recover women's roles in
patenting and manufacturing corsets, and, in my case study, to trace the
32. See, e.g., DYNAMOS AND VIRGINS REVISITED, supra note 26; FEMINISM IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICINE (Angela N.H. Creager, Elizabeth Lunbeck & Londa
Schiebinger eds., 2001); GENDER & TECHNOLOGY: A READER (Nina E. Lerman, Ruth Oldenziel &
Arwen P. Mohun eds., 2003); EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985);
RUTH OLDENZIEL, MAKING TECHNOLOGY MASCULINE: MEN, WOMEN AND MACHINES IN MODERN
AMERICA, 1870-1945 (1999); MARGARET W. ROSSITER, WOMEN SCIENTISTS IN AMERICA: BEFORE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1940-1975 (1995); MARGARET W. ROSSITER, WOMEN SCIENTISTS IN AMERICA:
STRATEGIES AND STRUGGLES TO 1940 (1982); LONDA L. SCHIEBINGER, THE MIND HAS No SEX?
WOMEN IN THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989); LONDA L. SCHIEBINGER, NATURE'S BODY:
GENDER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE (1993). Burk has also pointed scholars to feminist
studies of science. Burk, Feminism and Dualism, supra note 19.
33. See, e.g., JUDITH A. McGAW, MOST WONDERFUL MACHINE: MECHANIZATION AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN BERKSHIRE PAPER MAKING, 1801-1885, at 335-74 (1987) (discussing gender roles in
nineteenth-century papermaking). A foundational example of the feminist analysis of household
technologies is RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF HOUSEHOLD
TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE (1983).
34. McGaw, supra note 16, at 172-73 (quoting KELLER, supra note 32).
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experiences of Frances Egbert as both corset-wearer and corset-manufacturer,
placing her in the context of other women who also assumed these roles.
By following the corset as a garment worn by women, beyond its travels
through the patent office and courtrooms, I also enter into those domains often
marked as feminine-the personal and the sexual. Here I borrow
methodologies from the feminist history of technology, but I also benefit from
the existing scholarship on the history of the corset, which has been written
largely from the perspective of the history of fashion and dress. The corset, as
an undergarment, was very personal to the woman who wore it. It was also
inherently gendered and sexualized as a garment that both heightened women's
secondary sexual characteristics with the goal of attracting the male gaze, and
controlled women's sexuality by limiting access to their flesh. It is these
aspects of corsetry that have drawn the attention of fashion historians, and led
Summers, in her study of the Victorian corset in England and the United States,
to conclude:
By the 1880s the pubescent child, the maid, the young woman, the
matron, the grandmother, the prostitute, and the subject of the
pornographer alike were marked as sexual by the [corset], for it
simultaneously evoked the entire continuum of sexual stereotypes from
chaste innocence to erotic perversion. In other words, corsetry
operated at all ages and all stages of women's lives, to create a body
that was appropriately modest and virginal, yet sexually alluring ....
[C]orsetry was a powerful coercive apparatus in the control of
Victorian women, and . . . it was subsequently instrumental, indeed
crucial, in the maintenance of Victorian hetero-patriarchal
dominance. 3
To consider gender, sexuality and patent law, I ultimately leave the corset
as material object behind and consider the corset as narrative object within
judicial opinions. The corset did not cease to evoke sexual stereotypes when it
became the object of legal scrutiny in the courtroom.36 In judicial opinions, we
35. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 8. In addition to Summers' work, the history of the corset is
explored in DAVID KUNZLE, FASHION AND FETISHISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE CORSET, TIGHT-
LACING, AND OTHER FORMS OF BODY-SCULPTURE IN THE WEST (1982); STEELE, supra note 5; NORA
wAUGH, CORSETS AND CRINOLINES (1954); and Casey Finch, "Hooked and Buttoned Together":
Victorian Underwear and Representations of the Female Body, 34 VICTORIAN STUD. 337, 347-48
(1991).
36. The relationship between women's clothing, gender, and sexuality in other areas of law has not
gone unremarked; it is explored in, for example, Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court
Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1108 (2005) (discussing First Amendment law), and Mary
Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73
(1982) (discussing employment law and other areas). Although not discussed in this Article, the
category of patented underwear extends well beyond the corset. The hoop skirt was also a patent-
protected technology of the nineteenth century, and inventors have continued to obtain patents to all
manner of female undergarments in the twentieth century. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 191,641 (issued
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can find traces of the social knowledge of corsets as gendered and sexualized
objects. A feminist analysis of patent law leads us to ask what we can
understand about patent doctrine when we consider the corset from this
perspective. How did the power of the law support or subvert the role of the
corset in maintaining "Victorian hetero-patriarchal dominance?"
C. An Archaeology of a Case
As part of sketching a feminist approach to patent law, it is worth thinking
briefly about my chosen methodology of linking the law and social history by
focusing on the single case of Egbert v. Lippmann. Such microhistory is an
established approach within legal history, using one case as a window into an
entire set of legal and social relations.38  There is also an analog for my
approach in the historical scholarship of material culture. In this blend of
museum studies and history, a single item within a museum or personal
collection is examined in detail and in context for all it can tell us about the
people who used it and the world in which they lived. In essence, the
methodology creates an archaeology of the recent past using historical tools.3 9
In choosing Egbert as the center of my case study for the intersection of
gender and patent law, I follow the guidance of both models of microanalysis,
using historical methods to craft an archaeology of the case employing all of
the tools described above. The archival court records for the trial of Egbert
proved to be gratifyingly full, and they provided a tantalizing glimpse of the
plaintiff herself in the handwritten transcript of her deposition. The docket
book for the circuit court allowed me to trace other cases filed by Frances that
did not lead to published opinions. I used city directories and records, court
records, and patent office documents to glean tidbits about all of the
participants in the case-the judge, the lawyers, the defendants, and the
witnesses-following one to another to map a web of connections within the
June 5, 1877) (hoop skirt springs); U.S. Patent No. 57,309 (issued Aug. 21, 1866) (hoop skirt); LEVINS,
supra note 15, at 153-76 (twentieth-century patents).
37. While Egbert is the focus of my analysis, I collected and reviewed all published opinions
regarding corsets between 1870 and 1900 as part of my effort to understand both the corset as patented
technology and the corset in the Victorian courtroom.
38. One of the more artful practitioners of this mode of legal history is Hendrik Hartog. See
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000). Within the history of technology,
McGaw has argued for the value of careful analysis of what she calls "small things," such as "red
wheelbarrows." Judith A. McGaw, "So Much Depends upon a Red Wheelbarrow": Agricultural Tool
Ownership in the Eighteenth-Century Mid-Atlantic, in EARLY AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY: MAKING AND
DOING THINGS FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1850, at 328, 333 (Judith A. McGaw ed., 1994).
39. One early collection illustrating this scholarly approach included an essay analyzing a corset
ordered as part of the bridal trousseau of a woman who was married in New York State in 1895. Leslie
Shannon Miller, The Many Figures of Eve: Styles of Womanhood Embodied in a Late-Nineteenth-
Century Corset, in AMERICAN ARTIFACTS: ESSAYS IN MATERIAL CULTURE 129 (Jules David Prown &
Kenneth Haltman eds., 2000). For work in material culture focused on textiles, see LAUREL THATCHER
ULRICH, THE AGE OF HOMESPUN: OBJECTS AND STORIES IN THE CREATION OF AN AMERICAN MYTH
(2001).
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New York corset business, a web linked by supply chains, patent assignments,
and startlingly frequent litigation.
While the richness of the source materials supported my analysis, as legal
scholars we have the luxury of choice. Often an item is chosen for material
culture analysis simply because it has survived-a rare exemplar of a once
common item. While accessibility to early case records and opinions is not at
all comparable to the easy electronic access we have to contemporary materials,
there are certainly many cases from which to choose. Why Egbert? I chose to
investigate Egbert because of its combination of prominence and strangeness,
included in the canon of patent law, yet somehow set apart by the oddities
mentioned above. Before beginning my analysis, I want to briefly catalogue the
elements of Egbert's strangeness that provided avenues for my feminist
analysis of the case, in the hopes that both the presence and the absence of such
elements in other cases might provide starting points for further analysis.
First, Egbert involved the corset as patented technology, which provides a
different slant on the corset's history and meaning. As patented technology, the
corset has a dual gender valence. It is coded feminine as a garment for women.
This femininity is what causes titters when Egbert is discussed in a patent
41class40--the corset appears as an oddity in a subject area that usually appears
gender-neutral.41 As Brownmiller noted and as my students grasp instinctively,
the corset was part of the social construction of femininity for decades. As
such, the corset can be considered a feminine technology; it is a tool for making
its wearer feminine. But as the subject of patents, it is also technology in the
way in which that term was coming to be understood in the late nineteenth
century, as something made by man. Technology and invention of technology
was and is coded masculine.42 The courts, when confronted with a corset as a
patented invention, had to navigate this duality. Reaching a decision in such a
case involved doing gender in one way or another, making it easier for us to see
the gendering of legal knowledge in the area of patent law, where gender is
often invisible.43 Following the corset through Egbert provides a means of
exposing the unfounded assumption of gender neutrality in patent law.
Second, Egbert involved a female plaintiff and patent-owner, Frances,
another oddity within patent casebooks. Women inventors are rare and were
even more rare in the nineteenth century. Who was this woman, this widow
40. 1 have experienced these titters not only when teaching Egbert, but whenever I discuss Egbert
before scholarly audiences, whether those audiences are gender scholars, intellectual property scholars,
or historians.
41. See supra note 31 and the accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of the gendering of technology as masculine in the late nineteenth century, see
OLDENZIEL, supra note 32. Like whiteness, masculinity is often overlooked. Lerman, supra note 30, at
894 (describing how the historiography of technology has largely excluded both race and gender). For
the racialization of the corset, see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
43. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that even asking whether patents
have gender is frequently seen as nonsensical).
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who wielded her deceased husband's patent so aggressively that she was
willing to litigate all the way to the Supreme Court? How did she overcome
the well-documented barriers to women patenting and commercially
developing inventions? These questions build upon the largest existing strain
of scholarship regarding gender and invention, that of women's participation in
the patent system. Understanding this aspect of Egbert's oddity helps to
answer questions of systematic gender bias in the functioning of the patent
system. Considering Egbert in the broader context of corset invention,
commercialization and litigation reveals the ways in which Frances both was
and was not exceptional.
Finally, Egbert turns upon the legal definition of "public." The public use
doctrine in patent law, first created by statute in 1839, creates a statutory bar to
patenting an otherwise patentable invention. An inventor is allowed only a
limited grace period for the "public use" of an invention prior to the filing of a
patent application.44 If the grace period is exceeded, the invention is no longer
patentable, and any patent issued is invalid and void as of issuance. Prior to
Egbert, the interpretation of this doctrine had turned on substance-had the
inventor created a situation in which the public would assume that the invention
was in the public domain, such that it would be unfair to allow him or her to
patent? A prominent treatise explained that the doctrine was triggered when an
inventor showed a clear intent to abandon the invention, generally by exploiting
it commercially without attempting to protect it.45 Egbert broadened the
existing law of "public use," making the analysis of "public" much more
formal. Since its issuance, Egbert has been steadily cited for the proposition
that use of a single patented article, by a single person, even if the use is known
only to that person and hidden from public view, can constitute "public use," as
long as there is no "limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy" on that
user.46 Any actual ability of the public to exploit the invention is not required,
so that "public use" became "not secret use." 47 The case established a bright-
line rule which has persisted to the present, and which makes it relatively easy
for inventors to trigger the statutory period, so that a lengthy delay between
44. Patent Act of March 3, 1839, § 7, 5 Stat. 354. The grace period has varied over time. The Act
of 1839 set the period at two years, a period which remained until 1939. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, § 1, 53
Stat. 1212. Today the bar is a one-year period, preventing an inventor from receiving a patent on an
otherwise patentable invention if the invention has been "in public use" or "on sale" more than twelve
months before the patent application filing date. Patent Act of 1952 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
The law has also varied with respect to whether use sufficient to trigger the statutory bar must be with
the consent of the inventor. Under the law in effect at the time Egbert was decided, this issue was
unclear, and the Supreme Court refused to decide it. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1881).
Today inventor consent to a public use is not needed to give rise to a bar. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
45. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 389 (3d ed. 1867).
46. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337; see cases cited supra note 9.
47. Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1959).
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invention and filing a patent application can prove fatal to the enforceability of
the resulting patent, as it did for the inventor in Egbert, Samuel H. Barnes.48
The oddity of Egbert within the development of the public use doctrine lies
in the incongruity of using a fact pattern about undergarments to broaden the
public use doctrine. The Court found that when Frances wore Samuel Barnes's
invention as part of her corset before he filed his patent application, her use of
the invention was "public." The Court went out of its way to reach this
conclusion, choosing not to rely on other evidence of public disclosure of the
invention that had been cited by the trial judge.49 Justice Miller's criticism of
the majority's opinion in his dissent seems as trenchant today as it did in 1881.
Given the holding, he proclaimed: "I am at a loss to know the line between a
private and a public use."50 In Victorian America, how could a woman's
underwear be considered public? And if Frances's corset was "in public use,"
what was left as "private use?" The feminist critique of the public/private
divide is a rich strand of feminist scholarship, related to the other dualist
critiques identified by Burk. This dualism, so central to legal thought, is
frequently aligned in Western thought with the masculine/feminine divide, and
as such, has been critiqued as promoting patriarchal hierarchy and restrictive
gender constructs.5 1 That the public use doctrine rests on categorizing a corset
as "public" must be considered in light of Summers's conclusion that the corset
was "crucial[] in the maintenance of Victorian hetero-patriarchal dominance." 52
If the corset was a signal and an instrument of female subordination to male
power, and male power was exercised in the public realm, what did it mean in
Victorian America to declare as a matter of law that Frances's corset was in
public use? The articulation of the public use doctrine in this way necessarily
implicates gender hierarchies. But was the Court in Egbert reinforcing or
subverting such hierarchies by performing gender through patent doctrine?
This final aspect of the strangeness of Egbert is related to the troubled and
gendered nature of the public/private divide and the social role of the corset in
patriarchal dominance. Only by making the gendered aspects of the corset as
material object, invented object, and narrative object explicit, can Justice
Miller's critique be answered.
I did not choose Egbert for any explicit discussion of gender or sexuality in
the case itself. The narrative of the case, as crafted by the Supreme Court
majority, sidesteps any reference to issues of gender and sexuality, including
the gendered nature of corsets and the personal relationship between the
48. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337.
49. See discussion infra, text accompanying note 228.
50. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 339.
51. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 16, at 438; Tushnet, supra note 18, at 291-94.
52. SUMMERs, supra note 5, at 8.
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inventor, Samuel Barnes, and Frances Egbert,53 the woman who wore his
invention. In summarizing the relevant testimony, the Court recounted that
Samuel's invention was made in 1855 after he was present when two women,
his "intimate friend," Frances, and her friend, Miss Cregier,54 were
"complaining of the breaking of their corset steels."55  "Steels" referred to
vertical stiffeners used on either side of the front closure of a corset.s While
the lived experience of daily corset wearing is difficult to access a century and
a half later, there are indications that women experienced recurrent difficulties
with the durability of corsets. Under the tension of lacing, the structural
supports of corsets would break, ruining the garment, causing social
embarrassment and perhaps even injury to the wearer.57 Frances testified that
the next time Samuel visited, he brought her a pair of steels he had made to
overcome this problem, using two pieces of metal fastened together to create a
doubled, reinforced steel. Frances then wore the steels sewn into her corset
for eleven years before Samuel filed his patent application. During that time,
Frances and Samuel were married. Writing for the majority, Justice Woods
characterized Samuel's gift of his innovative steels to Frances as a transfer of
an invention "without limitation or restriction," and analogized the steels sewn
into her corset to an innovative gear "covered from view in the recesses of a
machine for spinning or weaving," hidden, but still public.59
The only indication in the majority opinion that the Court was aware of the
gendered nature of corsets, and of the emotional and sexual aspects of the
relationship between Frances and Samuel, comes in the concluding section,
when the Court used what to contemporary readers appears to be a sly
innuendo in chastising Samuel. In letting Frances continue to wear his steels,
the Court found, Samuel "slept on his rights for eleven years." 60 Many patent
53. Frances used at least four different last names during the years preceding the Supreme Court
opinion: Willis, Lee, Barnes, and Egbert. For the sake of clarity, I refer to both Samuel and Frances by
their first names in this paper. According to the records of Frances's marriage in 1870 to Wesley
Egbert, Willis was her birth name. She used Barnes from 1863 to 1870, while she was the wife and then
widow of the inventor Samuel Barnes, referring to herself as Frances Lee Barnes. The case was filed
after she married Egbert and took his name. I have not found any record of a marriage to a Mr. Lee.
54. The Supreme Court calls Frances's friend Miss Cugier. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335. The original
longhand deposition transcript, as well as the printed version submitted to the Court, calls her Miss
Cregier, and that is the name I use. Transcript of Deposition of Frances Lee Egbert, Egbert v.
Lippmann, Box 297, Case 428A (C.C.S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1875), at 2; Transcript of Record, Egbert v.
Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881) (No. 335), at 15.
55. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335.
56. Steels were also called "stays" or "springs." Samuel's patent was titled "Improvement in
Corset-springs." U.S. Patent No. 56,345 (issued July 17, 1866).
57. STEELE, supra note5, at 73; SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 28.
58. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 15. Frances's testimony is summarized by the Court at
Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335.
59. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336.
60. Id. at 337.
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attorneys can recite this sentence of the case with a grin.6 ' This phrasing,
reminding the reader that Frances and Samuel shared a bed for some portion of
this period-it is undisputed that they married before Samuel filed his patent
application-has led casebook authors to indulge in mild witticisms that
acknowledge the gendered context of the case, such as stating that "if given a
choice between a statutory bar to his invention and a permanent bar to his
marriage [by insulting Frances with a requirement of a written confidentiality
agreement], Samuel no doubt made the right choice."62
Frances might have failed to see the wit in such a remark. It was she, after
all, who was the plaintiff in Egbert. Samuel died soon after his patent for the
corset steels issued in July 1866, leaving a will in which Frances was named as
his sole devisee and executrix. She spent the next fifteen years aggressively
seeking to maximize the value of the patent, first as a widow, and later with the
assistance of her subsequent husband, Wesley Egbert, whom she married in
187 0.6 In hindsight, she might well have preferred such an insult to the
eventual loss of her patent.
As a case study in the nascent effort to consider gender and patent law,
Egbert thus offers a rich blend of facts and doctrine. It provides a test case for
feminist analysis. Does the oddity of Egbert's holding, a taken-for-granted part
of patent doctrine, dissolve when the analytic lens is shifted from patent law to
gender studies? My answer, as developed in Part V, is yes. Patents and patent
law do have gender, and examining corset patent litigations, including Egbert,
exposes gender at work. I argue that the Supreme Court's opinion was
motivated by the Justices' keen awareness of Victorian gender hierarchies, and,
in particular, by the public and private uses of corsets to signal gender and
sexuality in the late nineteenth century. By putting Frances in the context of
the wider world of corset inventions and manufacture, I show that, from a
Victorian perspective, Frances was neither odd in her position as the female
owner of a corset-related patent, as a female litigant in patent infringement
cases, nor as a businesswoman who participated as a partner in corset
manufacturing, making and selling Samuel's invention. But she was unique in
that as well as assuming these more common public roles, which had led her to
the Supreme Court as a plaintiff, she also appeared in court as the unmarried
"intimate friend" of the inventor. In the same case, Frances presented herself
61. One senior patent attorney described this sentence to me as his "favorite" quotation in patent
law, yet expressed puzzlement when I suggested that the case implicated questions of gender and
sexuality, revealing that he shared the commonly held belief that patent law is gender-neutral.
62. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 522-27. While it is impossible to know whether Justice
Woods intended a double entendre by his use of the phrase "slept on his rights," the Oxford English
Dictionary confirms that both the phrase "to sleep on," meaning to delay a decision, and the phrase "to
sleep with," meaning to engage in sexual relations, were in use by about 1880. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
63. Will of Samuel H. Barnes, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 158-59 (dated Aug. 8,
1866).
64. Bill of Complaint, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 2.
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on both sides of the gendered public/private divide within American society,
and thus posed a challenge to a Court considering the difference between public
and private with respect to inventions. Faced with a choice between
acknowledging the intimacy between Frances and Samuel as an unmarried
couple at the time of his invention in 1855 and according Frances the public
role as businesswoman she had achieved by the 1870s, the Court chose the
latter. In the end, it was not that Samuel "slept on his rights," but that Frances
wielded those rights, publicly and successfully, which better explains the
Supreme Court's broad definition of "public" and reveals the highly gendered
origins of the "public use" doctrine.
PART II. THE CORSET AS TECHNOLOGY
In the context of the industrializing United States in the post-Civil War
decades, sometimes called the "Golden Age" of invention, the corset seems to
be a trivial and mundane technology when compared to the telephone or the
light bulb. Yet long before most Americans had access to the new electric
lights or had used a telephone, the corset was a pervasive and essential part of
everyday life and a surprisingly complicated and varied garment. There was
plenty of scope for its improvement, many Americans with experience in its
use, and significant sums to be made in its manufacture and sale. In patenting
his improved corset steel in 1866, Samuel was part of the leading edge of an
explosion in corset patents, which would peak at the turn of the century.
Corsets came to North America with colonization. Women in western
Europe had been wearing stiffened bodices since at least the fourteenth century.
By the fifteenth century, as European countries began to explore North
America, aristocratic women were wearing bodices that laced in the front and
back, to provide a stiffened torso and support form-fitting clothing. In the
sixteenth century, bodices were sometimes made more rigid by inserting
whalebones along the front and sides. These garments could be either outer
garments or undergarments. 65 The shape, materials, and manufacture of the
garments varied considerably, as did the type of bodies who wore them. The
overall trend, which hid considerable regional variation and short-term shifts of
fashion, was a transition from the corset as a garment of the aristocracy, worn
by both men and women, to a garment which in its nineteenth-century heyday
was worn almost exclusively by women, but by women of all social classes and
66
ages.
65. ELIZABETH EWING, DRESS AND UNDRESS: A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S UNDERWEAR 22,27 (1978)
(detailing different terms for these bodices, including "bodys" [sic] and "stays"); STEELE, supra note 5,
at 6. In this Article, I use the term most common in the late nineteenth century, "corset," to refer to all
such garments.
66. The history of the corset is discussed in C. WILLET CUNNINGTON & PHILLIS CUNNINGTON, THE
HISTORY OF UNDERCLOTHES 62-64, 106-07, 127-28, 130-32 (1992); EWING, supra note 65, at 22-24;
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The use of corsets in the North American colonies has not been studied in
detail, but can be deduced in outline. 6 7  Efforts to import and maintain an
aristocracy in the colonies were largely unsuccessful, and thus, the number of
women who attempted to wear the fashions of the European elite must have
been limited. Finery in dress was explicitly discouraged in certain New
England colonies, and American republican ideals during the revolutionary and
early republic period supported homespun and plain dress.68  By the early
nineteenth century, however, women in the United States were striving to reach
European standards of fashion. These standards included the corset, which
was increasingly adopted by middle-class women. In both the United States
and western Europe, corset makers were at work in major urban centers,
providing this key foundation garment for the latest fashion in female dress.70
Corsets served to transform the body, creating an idealized silhouette.
They could emphasize and augment certain body parts, usually hips and
breasts, both by pushing flesh up and/or down and by the use of padding.
Corsets could also emphasize by diminishing and reshaping, as lacing was used
to reduce the diameter of the waist, and also to reshape the natural oval of a
human waist into a circle.7' Corsets were also used to affect posture, creating a
rigidity of the torso that varied as corsets varied in length, from belt-like
models, to those suspending from the shoulders and covering the breasts, to
others reaching down to encase the abdomen and hips. This rigidity served to
cabin and contain flesh, to prevent jiggling and to make the very feeling of
flesh inaccessible under layers of metal, wood, bone and fabric.72 Corsets
could tilt the spine into the desired shape, from poker-straightness to the S-
curve emphasized in the turn of the twentieth-century Gibson girl ideal. 73 The
ultimate utility of the corset as patented technology was to achieve this ideal
feminine form, although most inventions were directed to improvements in the
making, wearing, or washing of the corset.
STEELE, supra note 5, at 6-33 (discussing pre-nineteenth-century corset wearing); SUMMERS, supra note
5 (focusing on the nineteenth century).
67. For general discussion of colonial female dress, see ALICE MORSE EARLE, TWO CENTURIES OF
COSTUME IN AMERICA, 1620-1820, at 51-159 (1910).
68. ULRICH, supra note 39; MICHAEL ZAKIM, READY-MADE DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY OF MEN'S
DRESS IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1760-1860, at 11-13 (2003).
69. The history of corsets in the United States is less well researched than that in England,
particularly for the colonial and antebellum periods. Summers's history of the Victorian corset focuses
on England, but contains some information on the United States. See SUMMERS, supra note 5. For a
discussion of American dress and fashion in the antebellum period, with some reference to the colonial
era, see Lois W. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY 17-85 (1983).
70. BANNER, supra note 69, at 28.
71. At times, both recent and medieval, corsets have also been used to minimize breasts and/or
hips, most recently during the early twentieth century, when a slender, boyish silhouette was in fashion.
STEELE, supra note 5, at 148.
72. Miller, supra note 39, at 137.
73. BANNER, supra note 69, at 22; EWING, supra note 65, at 110-11; STEELE, supra note 5, at 84.
74 [Vol. 23:57
Getting a Grip on the Corset
For example, in the 1860s, Americans obtained patents for new ways of
cutting the pieces of cloth in order to form a garment from fewer pieces,
reducing manufacturing time and cost. A garment that included bone, wood,
and/or metal posed special challenges in washing, and some inventors sought
patents on improvements to promote the ease of removal and reinsertion of
non-fabric components, or to reduce rust spots, evidently an on-going
frustration.74  The late-nineteenth-century corset, as a highly structured
garment, relied upon the technological transformations of the cloth-making,
sewing, and metalworking industries in the eighteenth century, which changed
the possibilities of corsetry. The development of metal eyelets riveted into the
cloth in the first decades of the nineteenth century was perhaps the key
technological change that supported the nineteenth-century heyday of the
corset. Metal eyelets supported tighter lacing of corsets, preventing the laces
from tearing the cloth of the garment. Further, steel pieces could be used to
replace or augment whalebone as side-stiffening inserts around the
circumference of the corset. Beginning around 1830, front "busks," rigid
pieces inserted vertically in the front of the corset to provide a smooth and stiff
front, traditionally made of wood or ivory, also began to be made of metal,
hence their new name, "steels."76 They were generally used in pairs, one on
either side of the front opening. While originally corsets opened only at the
back, or laced closed both back and front, metal allowed for ways of holding
together the front halves which could be undone by the wearer, freeing her
from the need of a second party to help her out of her corset. The back of the
corset would be laced, using metal eyelets to protect the fabric, and the front of
the corset could open down the middle, with clasps linking the pair of steels.
Corset makers experimented with various types of clasps, attached to the fabric
or as part of the steels.7 7 These front-fastening corsets became common after
about 1850.78 Samuel and many others were seeking to improve this new
component of the corset.
In addition to the inclusion of other materials such as straw, wood, bone,
leather, and metal, corsets by mid-century were generally made up of at least
eight pieces of cloth, cut in particular shapes and sewn together, and could have
as many as fifty pieces to allow for a form-fitting shape.79 The cloth was sewn
74. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 84,746 (issued Dec. 8, 1868) (way of treating steel to prevent rusting);
U.S. Patent No. 48,045 (issued June 6, 1865) (way of removing steels for washing); U.S. Patent No.
39,964 (issued Sept. 15, 1863) (way of cutting fabric). Warner Brothers advertised a line of "rust-proof"
corsets. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 193 (reproducing a copy of Warner's advertisement).
75. STEELE, supra note 5, at 44.
76. Id. at 10-12, 43.
77. Id. at 43. As in all aspects of corsetry, the terms for the fasteners and the springs were
numerous. Steels or springs that also served to hook the corset closed in front were sometimes called
"clasps," a term that could also refer to hook and eye or other types of metal fastenings. This Article
uses the term "steels."
78. CUNNINGTON & CUNNINGTON, supra note 66, at 149.
79. U.S. Patent No. 96,951 (issued Nov. 16, 1869).
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together by specialized seamstresses and shaped with stiffeners into an
approximation of an hourglass shape. Women could also make their own,
following directions and patterns published in women's magazines, although
that option, like home dressmaking generally, became a less common choice
over the course of the nineteenth century.so Corsets, at first a made-to-order
garment, became, in the second half of the nineteenth century, part of the
ready-to-wear revolution, available in shops and through mail order to women
of all income levels and geographic locations.8 1 The ready-to-wear corset was
most often a loom-woven corset, rather than a hand-sewn garment. Using
powered looms, manufacturers could greatly increase their production volumes,
although the finishing of the corsets, including insertion of all the non-fabric
parts, continued to be done by hand.82 The transition to woven corsets was
another fertile area for patenting, as expert weavers applied their knowledge in
new directions, and engineers skilled in power looms adapted them for corset
production.83
A. Corset Patents and Patentees
Even before the ready-to-wear revolution, nearly all socioeconomic classes
of American women wore corsets regularly, including some slaves and female
prisoners.8 4 When Samuel undertook to develop a stronger corset steel in 1855,
he stepped into an increasingly crowded commercial and inventive space, as the
broad popularity of corsets in the nineteenth century supported multiple layers
of commerce in corset parts and finished corsets. The business of corsets
included steel temperers who manufactured parts, skilled seamstresses and
fitters, and door-to-door saleswomen. By the 1850s, when Samuel invented
his steel, and even more so by the 1860s, when he patented it, corsets were a
complicated, necessary, and commonplace technology in the United States. It
is thus no surprise that with each decade of the nineteenth century, more
inventors sought to patent improvements in corsetry.
The earliest United States patent relating to corsetry, for a device for
inserting eyelets into cloth, issued in 1837.86 There were almost no corset
80. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 11.
81. STEELE, supra note 5, at 44; Smith, supra note 6.
82. The manufacture of loom-woven corsets is discussed in the deposition testimony in Cohn v.
U.S. Corset Co. Transcript of Record, Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, passim (1876) (No. 106);
see also Smith, supra note 6.
83. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 88,365 (issued Mar. 30, 1869); U.S. Patent No. 65,112 (issued May
28, 1867); U.S. Patent No. 38,195 (issued Apr. 14, 1863); U.S. Patent No. 37,547 (issued Jan. 27, 1863).
84. STEELE, supra note 5, at 49; SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 9-10, 13-14, 16.
85. SUMMERS,supra note 5, at 33 (discussing corset makers and saleswomen). For a steel temperer,
see John Fitzpatrick, discussed infra text accompanying note 127.
86. U.S. Patent No. 181 (issued April 5, 1837). The data presented herein were collected using
electronic searching of multiple patent databases using the term "corset," and then discarding patents
unrelated to corsets (e.g., patents to hoopskirts, stocking supporters, medical treatments). The numbers
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patents issued through 1850 (about two in total),87 and then the rate of patenting
began to increase. During the 1850s, about six corset-related patents issued,
and then, in the 1860s, the decade in which Samuel Barnes obtained his long-
delayed patent, about 100 corset-related patents issued, despite the dip in
overall patent applications coinciding with the Civil War.8 8  The numbers
continued to rise throughout the nineteenth century. Samuel was thus on the
leading edge of this increasing attention to the corset as patent-protected
technology. By the 1870s, when his patent was being litigated, his patent was
one of hundreds of such patents. The corset was both a common part of
everyday apparel, and a commonplace within the patent system.
As a man, Samuel was a typical nineteenth-century inventor. The
manufacture of corsets, however, was an art that had traditionally involved not
only women's bodies as the intended target of the technology, but also women
as manufacturers themselves. Both in Europe and in the United States, corset
manufacture had long involved both men and women as proprietors of their
own small shops and as employers of others, drawing upon both the
traditionally male trade of tailoring and the traditionally female trade of
dressmaking.89 Women's involvement in corset manufacture led them to
invent improvements and seek patents in numbers much greater than their
overall participation in the patent system. Almost one quarter of corset-related
patents issued in the United States before 1880 were issued to women.90
of what I am calling corset-related patents must be considered approximate. The U.S. Patent Office has
made nineteenth-century patents available for electronic searching, but the poor quality of the electronic
texts, apparently caused by optical character recognition problems in scanning, renders any word search
of early patents inexact.
87. U.S. Patent No. 2360 (issued May 20, 1842) (umbilical supporter and corset); U.S. Patent No.
1940 (issued Jan. 21, 1841) (pregnancy corset).
88. The number of issued patents from 1861 until 1863 was lower each year than the number
issued in 1860. By 1864, the number of issued patents reached pre-war levels, and then, in 1865, it
jumped about thirty-three percent. U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/idoloeip/taf/h_counts.htm. Note
that generally, the rate of patenting per person increased in the United States during the second half of
the nineteenth century, although as different technologies increased and decreased in importance, the
rate of patents for a particular technology might not have followed the overall curve. Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Introduction: The Organization and Finance of Innovation in
American History, in FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1870 TO THE PRESENT, at 9
(Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007).
89. STEELE, supra note 5, at 16-18; SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 30-33.
90. Counting patents issued to women in the United States is notoriously difficult because the
patent office did not collect any sex-specific information, and its attempt to retrospectively identify
women's patented inventions at the end of the nineteenth century has been proven flawed. Merritt, supra
note 15, at 245-46. Further, the number of women who invented, but whose inventions were patented in
the name of men because of women's legal disabilities, or otherwise, is uncountable. B. Zorina Khan,
Married Women's Property Laws and Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from U.S. Patent Records,
1790-1895, 56 J. ECON. HIST. 356 (1996) (noting that women patented more often as legal disabilities
were reduced). This estimate is based on my own research and is approximate due to both the
inexactitude of counting corset-related patents and the need to rely on first names and titles to identify
patents issued to women. Patents issued to inventors identified only by first initials were thus not
included. For further discussion of counting female inventors, see KHAN, supra note 15, at 133 n. 16.
Khan has counted 240 corset patents issued to women between 1790 and 1895, and 1661 corset patents
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Women's much more significant representation in patents in this area reflected
the clustering of women's patenting activity generally in areas related to
domestic manufacture and sewing, activities in which women often engaged.91
One of the earliest United States patents issued to any woman was granted in
1809 to Mary Kies for a method of weaving straw to make hats, and women
ever since have patented in the area of clothing, particularly women's and
children's clothing. 92 While women always experienced barriers to patenting,9 3
they have been more successful in overcoming those barriers in these areas of
technology than in many others.
The robust participation by American women in the patenting of corsets
paralleled that of women in Great Britain, where women also obtained
noticeable numbers of patents. Summers, in her analysis of nineteenth-century
British corset patents, has described male inventors as having a near-obsession
"with reinforcing all aspects of the corset," while "a significant number" of
patents received by women-although not all-focused on the comfort of
corsets.94 A review of United States corset-related patents does not reveal any
such neat bifurcation. While male inventors did not discuss comfort often, and
indeed, lacked the experience necessary to do so, they did make inventions to
reduce the problem of steels poking through the fabric of corsets,95 to facilitate
laundering corsets by allowing the easy removal of steels, 9 6 and to replace stiff
and heavy metal stays with lighter and more flexible ones made of treated
rawhide9 7 or wood,98 all of which might have been designed to increase
comfort and/or ease of use. Both men and women proposed innovations in the
number and shape of cloth pieces from which the corset was sewn, to improve
fit and to limit wastage, and in the steel used, to reduce rusting.99
Women and men also used their patents in similar ways. Some women,
like Frances, used the patents they controlled in their own businesses. Others
sold or licensed their patents to larger concerns. Lavinia Foy, a resident of
Worcester, Massachusetts, obtained at least thirteen patents related to corsets
in total, calculating women's participation at less than ten percent across the entire nineteenth century.
Id. at 146.
91. KHAN, supra note 15, at 144-46; Khan, supra note 15.
92. KHAN, supra note 15, at 134; PILATO, supra note 26, at 37, 41-43. Kies is often credited as the
first female patentee in the United States. Khan has identified an earlier patent granted in 1808 to Hazel
Irwin for a method of cheese manufacture. Khan, supra note 15, at 165.
93. See KHAN, supra note 15; Khan, supra note 15; Merritt, supra note 15; sources cited supra note
28; infra text accompanying notes 102-103.
94. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 24-27.
95. U.S. Patent No. 40,298 (issued Oct. 6, 1863).
96. U.S. Patent No. 48,045 (issued June 6, 1865).
97. U.S. Patent No. 56,438 (issued July 17, 1866).
98. U.S. Patent No. 86,920 (issued Feb. 16, 1869).
99. For example, U.S. Patent No. 84,746 (issued Dec. 8, 1868) was granted jointly to Catharine
Maxwell and I. Newton Pierce. Phillip Lippmann, a defendant in Egbert, obtained a patent to an
improved clasp that he alleged would be more resistant to rust. U.S. Patent No. 143,359 (issued Sept.
30, 1873).
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between 1862 and 1884,100 and reportedly received an annual income of
$25,000 in license fees.or
Since the late nineteenth century, feminists and scholars have attempted,
first, to dispel the belief that technology and invention are inherently
masculine, and second, to provide social, rather than biological, explanations
for the rarity of nineteenth-century women inventors. The laundry list of
obstacles to patenting by women is long and real: the legal disabilities suffered
by married women throughout much of the nineteenth century, the lack of
female access to education and technical training, and social condemnation of
women acting for themselves in the commercial realm, which limited women's
ability to tap into networks of manufacturers, financiers, lawyers, and
businessmen necessary to transform an inventive idea into a successful
commercial product.102 It has been argued, too, that the predominantly male
patent examiners took feminine inventions, that is, technologies used only by
women, less seriously.' 03
Yet, within the world of corset making, numerous women were able to
overcome these obstacles. They invented, they obtained patents, they sold or
licensed their patents, they defended and asserted their patents in court, and
they used their patents to support the development of successful businesses.
Just as women used their patents similarly to men, to the extent that I have been
able to determine, men and women tapped into similar networks of
professionals to obtain and enforce corset-related patents. For example, male
and female inventors used the same patent attorneys to prepare their patent
applications, including the most prominent attorneys of the day. One of the
deponents in Egbert, Mina Sebille, patentee and proprietor of her own corset
workshop in New York City, hired Lemuel Serrell to prepare her application
for an improved corset. Serrell later acted as a patent attorney for Thomas
Edison, perhaps the most successful inventor of the era.104 Frances, seeking a
reissue of Samuel's patent as his widow, used the same patent agents as had
100. U.S. Patent No. 523,888 (issued July 31, 1894); U.S. Patent No. 214,247 (issued Apr. 15,
1879); U.S. Patent No. 200,384 (issued Feb. 19, 1878); U.S. Patent No. 197,463 (issued Nov. 27, 1877);
U.S. Patent No. 79,647 (issued July 7, 1868); U.S. Patent No. 54,323 (issued May 1, 1866); U.S. Patent
No. 45,296 (issued Nov. 29, 1864); U.S. Patent No. 41,987 (issued Mar. 22, 1864); U.S. Patent No.
39,911 (issued Sept. 15, 1863); U.S. Patent No. 39,910 (issued Sept. 15, 1863); U.S. Patent No. 39,909
(issued Sept. 15, 1863); U.S. Patent No. 39,908 (issued Sept. 15, 1863); U.S. Patent No. 35,930 (issued
July 22, 1862).
101. KHAN, supra note 15, at 146-48 (citing MACDONALD, supra note 28). Note that Merritt lists
only thirteen patents for Foy, Merritt, supra note 15, at 259, whereas Khan describes her as having
seventeen patents.
102. For an extensive discussion of women's disabilities in invention and patenting during the
nineteenth century, see PILATO, supra note 26, passim.
103. Id. at 3-5. The first female patent examiner was hired in 1872. Id. at 11. Because I have
examined only issued patents, and not rejected patent applications, I am unable to assess the truth of this
claim as applied to corsets, except to note the large numbers of corset-related patents that were granted
to both men and women.
104. U.S. Patent No. 39,964 (issued Sept. 15, 1863). For Serrell's work for Edison, see PAUL
ISRAEL, EDISON: A LIFE OF INVENTION 56,97 (1998).
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Samuel, Munn & Co. In relying upon Munn, a New York-based patent agency
that advertised heavily and was noted for the high volume of their applications,
Frances was joined by both female and male corset inventors.'s Both in
inventing and patenting corsets, at least some nineteenth-century American
women had access to the needed skills and assistance, and were able to
convince the patent office that their applications were meritorious. While
Frances, as the plaintiff in Egbert, was slightly unusual in litigating her patent
to the United States Supreme Court, she was not particularly unusual in her role
as a businesswoman in corsetry, or as a female applicant to the patent office in
that art.
B. Corset Patent Litigation in the New York Metropolitan Area
Patent litigation was a lively area of practice in the federal courts in the
nineteenth century, and just as corset patents were commonplace, so too was
corset patent litigation. During the late nineteenth century, Egbert was not the
only corset case on the docket of the Southern District of New York, where it
was filed, 06 or before the Supreme Court. 10 7 Further, about one-quarter of the
reported patent cases across the country involved female plaintiffs.'0o As this
proportion correlates with the proportion of corset-related patents issued to
women during this period, women apparently were litigating their patents about
as often as men. Any conclusions based on published decisions, however, must
necessarily be tentative. The only certainty about patent litigation rates in the
nineteenth century is that published cases provide only a very rough proxy of
the caseload of the federal courts. Initial evidence from the dockets in
Philadelphia and New York indicates that counting published opinions
probably grossly underestimates the volume of patent litigations filed.109
105. Women: Emilie J. Meriman, U.S. Patent No. 81,926 (issued Sept. 8, 1868); Marie T. Smith,
U.S. Patent No. 93,489 (issued Aug. 10, 1869). Men: Myron H. Beckworth, U.S. Patent No. 65,636
(issued June 11, 1867); James P. Love, U.S. Patent No. 65,246 (issued May 28, 1867). For the role of
Munn & Co. in patent practice, see Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the Professional Patent
Practitioner, 50 TECH. & CULTURE 519, 542-43 (2009).
106. Other reported cases involving corset patents include Hardy v. Marble, 10 F. 752
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Thomson v. Jacobs, 23 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877); Seligman v. Day, 21 F.
Cas. 1040 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876); Carstaedt v. U.S. Corset Co., 5 F. Cas. 188 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); and
Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 6 F. Cas. 28 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874).
107. Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366 (1876).
108. This estimate is based on collecting all published decisions containing the word "corset"
decided in 1890 or earlier, and then identifying cases in which a corset patent was at issue. There are
twenty-five such cases, including the Egbert decisions in the trial court and the Supreme Court. Seven
of these had female plaintiffs (including the Egbert case) and two others involved patents issued to
women, although the female patentees were not directly involved in the litigation. Since the number of
reported cases is rather small, and the number of cases which were filed but did not result in published
decisions may be as great or greater, it is quite possible that female participation in patent litigation was
either more or less extensive than female participation in patent prosecution.
109. The best available data on unreported patent cases in the nineteenth century is that being
collected by Christopher Beauchamp, Brooklyn Law School. Personal communication with author.
[Vol. 23:5780
Getting a Grip on the Corset
Frances herself filed four patent cases and one trademark case related to corsets
in a five-year period, and only two of these cases resulted in published
opinions."10
One indicia of the rate of corset patent litigations in the late nineteenth
century can be found in the docket of Samuel Blatchford, the federal judge in
New York who heard the Egbert case at the trial level. Blatchford served as
circuit judge from 1872 to 1882."' During those eleven years, he heard not
only Frances's five lawsuits related to intellectual property in corsets, but three
other reported corset-related patent litigations.112 Given than Frances alone
filed three suits that did not result in reported decisions, Blatchford's overall
corset patent docket was probably even greater." 3 At least in the Southern
District of New York, corset patent litigation was relatively common. When
Blatchford heard the Egbert case, he already had experience with corsets as
patented technology.114  Neither Blatchford nor the Supreme Court Justices
would have experienced Egbert as an oddity because of its subject matter or
female plaintiff.
Taking a closer look at the cases filed in the Circuit Court of the Southern
District of New York in the 1870s and 1880s can also provide information
about the networks of competing retailers and suppliers in which Frances was
attempting to earn money using Samuel's patent. Samuel and Frances were
both residents of New York City during the time of his invention and its later
commercial exploitation by Frances. The court records in Frances's litigations,
and the published decisions in other corset patent cases, provide a window into
the mixed-sex world of corset manufacture in New York City in the second half
of the nineteenth century, and the extensive use of patents in that business. The
litigation records reveal that both men and women obtained patents as a
common part of operating small, regional manufacturing shops. Like Frances,
others in these networks used patents to protect innovations in a rapidly
developing technology, and to better participate in patent litigation.
110. Frances's many lawsuits are discussed in Part IV infra. The reported cases were Egbert v.
Lippmann, 8 F. Cas. 370 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878) and Barnes v. Straus, 2 F. Cas. 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872).
Ill. ERWIN SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 68 (1990). Blatchford was
elevated to the United States Supreme Court in 1882. Blatchford's legal career is summarized in his
obituary. Obituary, Justice Blatchford Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1893.
112. Hardy v. Marble, 10 F. 752 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Thomson v. Jacobs, 23 F. Cas. 1099
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877); Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 6 F. Cas. 28 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874).
113. Because the only way to count unreported cases is to review all docket sheets for the court for
the relevant years, which are organized simply by defendant's name, I do not claim to have identified all
corset cases heard by Blatchford, nor have I made investigations in other courts or for other judges in
New York City or elsewhere.
114. In addition to the corset patent cases over which he presided, supra note 112, Blatchford wrote
and published case reports of other corset patent cases. See, e.g., Seligman v. Day, 21 F. Cas. 1040, 14
Blatchf. 72 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876); Carstaedt v. U.S. Corset Co., 5 F. Cas. 188, 13 Blatchf. 119
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); SURRENCY, supra note 111, at 68, 71.
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Not only was Frances a frequent filer in the Circuit Court of New York,11s
but nearly every other participant in Egbert was involved in other patent suits.
Lawyers, witnesses, and parties frequently knew each other. Using Egbert as a
starting point, we can trace the connections among them. Frances hired one of
the nation's most prominent patent attorneys, George Gifford, to bring all of
her suits." As with the patent agents she used, Frances had access to the same
level of legal representation as her male competitors. Gifford had successfully
managed the patent portfolios of the major sewing machine companies during
the 1850s and 1860s. 17  Not only did Gifford have broad experience with
patent litigation, but he had specific experience with corset litigation. Gifford
twice defended the United States Corset Company against allegations of patent
infringement in the Circuit Court of New York, and argued before the United
States Supreme Court on appeal in one of those cases.' 18  Gifford was also
counsel of choice for one of the largest ready-to-wear corset manufacturers,
Thomson, Langdon & Co., who sold the heavily advertised "Thomson's Glove-
Fitting Corset."" 9 It called upon Gifford to represent the firm in a suit alleging
patent infringement by the New Haven, Connecticut-based corset manufacturer,
Jacobs, Strouse & Co. 12 0 Gifford had already represented Frances in an earlier
suit against Jacobs, Strouse & Co. 12 1
The defendants in Egbert were Phillip Lippmann and August Seligmann.122
The men were former partners in a corset clasp manufacturing business in New
York City that controlled a corset patent issued to Phillip Lippmann in 1873.123
While Frances's suits were pending against Lippmann and Seligmann,
Seligmann sued Joseph Day and Nathan Hyman for infringement of the
Lippmann patent. Seligmann moved aggressively, seeking a preliminary
injunction against infringement of the patent, which was to a form of covered
115. In filing multiple suits to enforce her patent, Frances was following common nineteenth-
century practice. Many patentees filed clusters of suits in a particular federal court as they attempted to
eliminate competition in a particular area. Personal communication with Christopher Beauchamp,
Brooklyn Law School. Note that during this period, the circuit court was primarily a trial court; there
were no federal courts of appeal other than the Supreme Court.
116. Note that Gifford did not represent Frances in her appeal to the Supreme Court. Her decision
to choose another lawyer could have been due to Gifford's advanced age. Bom in 1811, he died in
1883, only two years after the opinion in Egbert. Obituary, George Gifford, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1883.
117. Id. The complicated patent arrangements in the sewing machine industry are discussed in
Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the
1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 165 (2011).
118. Carstaedt, 5 F. Cas. 188; Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 6 F. Cas. 28 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874), af'd93
U.S. 366 (1876).
119. Thomson v. Jacobs, 23 F. Cas. 1099, 1099 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877); STEELE, supra note 5, at 54,
119 (reproducing the "Thomson's Glove-Fitting Corset" advertisements).
120. The location of Jacobs, Strouse & Co. is discussed in Transcript of Deposition of Edward E.
Cargill, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 140-4 1.
121. Barnes v. Jacobs (C.C.S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 30, 1872).
122. In addition to the case that became Egbert v. Lippmann, Frances filed a second case against
Lippmann and Seligmann for trademark infringement, discussed infra text accompanying notes 203-
204.
123. U.S. Patent No. 143,359 (filed Nov. 2, 1872).
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corset clasp. The court found that the Lippmann patent lacked novelty and
refused to grant a preliminary injunction to Seligmann.124
Lippmann was not the only witness in Egbert who held his own corset-
related patents. Four other deponents in Egbert held corset-related patents:
Mina Sebille,12 5 William Cargill, 12 John Fitzpatrick,127 and Ferdinand Straus,
who was the defendant in Frances's first patent litigation case.128 The
testimony of these regional businesspeople provides evidence not only of the
commonplace use of patents in the corset business, but also as to the nature of
different commercial concerns within corsetry and the relationships among
them.
Mrs. Mina Sebille patented an improved way of cutting the fabric pieces
for a corset in 1863, just a year after she went into business as a corset maker in
New York City. 129  While Mrs. Sebille possibly was in business with her
husband, she was sufficiently involved in the business to testify as to its
suppliers.' 3 0  She was not alone as a female corset maker in the city. Her
supplier of corset steels, a Mr. Charles Schneller, who both sold steels and
manufactured corsets in his own shop, testified about the network of small
corset makers who bought his steels, and named equal numbers of men and
women as the proprietors who were among his customers. A person of either
sex might apprentice with someone of the other sex before opening his or her
own business. Mrs. Sherman, whose establishment was in Brooklyn, employed
at least two women and one male corset cutter.132 Mr. Geering, who emigrated
from Switzerland as a corset maker, testified that he worked for a Mrs. Bowles
in her shop before going into business for himself.133
Patentees Cargill and Fitzpatrick represented another type of small
businessman in corsetry, those who specialized in the metal parts of corsets
without themselves making the finished product. The two lived and worked in
Connecticut. Cargill described his occupation as a manufacturer of corset
clasps and steels since 1862.134 He worked first for Jacob, Strouse & Co. in
New Haven and then set up his own manufactory in Waterbury, Connecticut.
124. Seligman v. Day, 21 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876).
125. U.S. Patent No. 39,964 (issued Sept. 5, 1863); Transcript of Deposition of Mina Sebille, in
Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 65-66.
126. U.S. Patent No. 78,056 (issued May 19, 1868); U.S. Patent No. 75,856 (issued March 24,
1868); U.S. Patent No. 73,873 (issued Jan. 28, 1868); Transcript of Deposition of William B. Cargill, in
Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 47-54, 86, 135-39, 148.
127. U.S. Patent No. 96,685 (issued Nov. 9, 1869); Transcript of Deposition of John Fitzpatrick, in
Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 143-47, 151-52.
128. Barnes v. Straus, 2 F. Cas. 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872); U.S. Patent No. 88,752 (issued Apr. 6,
1869).
129. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 65.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 63-64.
132. Id. at 224-26.
133. Id. at 55-56.
134. Id. at 47.
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Cargill held three corset-related patents to improved corset clasps.135 He began
his business in his garret, then moved it to a "little shop" in the yard of his
house, where he worked along with his son and two female employees.
William Cargill's son, Edward, had also worked for Jacob, Strouse & Co., as
had John Fitzpatrick who patented his version of a reinforced steel in 1869.137
After leaving the firm, Fitzpatrick also lived and worked in Waterbury as a
steel temperer for a company that made both corset steels and carriage
trimmings.138
As the owner of a patent to an improved corset steel, Frances was striving
to find a way of making money among these networks of steel manufacturers
and corset makers in a commercial environment which included both local
businesses and nationalizing companies like Thomson, Langdon & Co.' As a
businesswoman, Frances would have encountered other businesswomen and
sharp competition from other steel manufacturers who had their own patents to
assert. The witnesses in her case no doubt knew each other, knew the past
history of suits among themselves, and were familiar with both the lawyers and
judges they encountered.
C. Construing a Corset Patent
This quick survey of corset patents and New York City corset patent
infringement cases in the second half of the nineteenth century resituates
Frances and her lawsuit. From a twenty-first-century perspective, Frances, as
an executrix attempting to enforce her dead husband's patent to a corset steel,
seems an unusual plaintiff, and her patent, to a metal piece of an undergarment,
seems an unusual subject for patent law. While the "corset case" may appear
anomalously feminine and frivolous in the midst of casebooks and treatises
filled with masculine inventors and masculine technology, there is every
indication that United States Supreme Court Justices in the late nineteenth
century would not have shared that viewpoint. Corsets were big business, they
were frequently the subject of inventions by both men and women, and
respected and elite members of the bar and bench had considerable
involvement with corsets as patented technology. Neither the sex of the
plaintiff in Egbert nor the corset as invention would have been unfamiliar to the
judges deciding Frances's, case in either the circuit court or the Supreme Court.
From this historically situated perspective, it is useful to consider one other
corset patent case in detail. Five years before Frances's case reached the
135. U.S. Patent No. 75,856 (issued May 24, 1868); U.S. Patent No. 78,056 (issued May 19, 1868);
U.S. Patent No. 73,873 (issued Jan. 28, 1868).
136. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 52.
137. U.S. Patent No. 96,685 (issued Nov. 9, 1869).
138. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 143-44.
139. See Smith, supra note 6 (discussing the transition to national companies in corsetry).
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Justices, the Supreme Court heard Cohn v. United States Corset Company,140
another case on appeal from a decision of Judge Blatchford. The facts of Cohn,
the arguments that were made, and the fate of Cohn's asserted patent provide a
useful foil for the analysis of gender and sexuality within Egbert.
1. Cohn v. United States Corset Company
A common scenario sparked the Cohn case: a group of employees left one
business to start their own competing business, causing their irate former
employer to sue. All parties were in the business of making woven corsets, and,
like so many other corset manufacturers, the employer, Moritz Cohn, had
obtained a patent that he was attempting to wield in order to shut down the
competing business of his former employees. If he could convince a court that
they were infringing his patent, he could stop them from using the knowledge
they had acquired in helping him produce an improved woven corset. 14 1
The testimony and court records in Cohn open a window onto another
segment of the corset business, highlighting the mass production of corsets on
powered looms. After about 1870, this segment of the corset manufacturing
industry increased.142 Cohn, a weaver by training, had a business in the
manufacture of hoop skirts, and saw an opportunity to expand into another type
of ladies' foundation wear, corsets, when the Convex Weaving Company went
out of business. He bought all the looms and hardware owned by Convex
Weaving and hired several of its employees to set up the equipment and get it
functioning.143
The type of corsets produced by Convex Weaving, by Cohn's factory, and
by the defendant United States Corset Company, were mass produced and then
finished by hand. They thus differed from the hand-sewn corsets made by the
networks of corset manufacturers who testified in Egbert, and were generally
cheaper to make. Cohn was interested in making corsets more cheaply still by
reducing the number of employees he had to hire to finish the corsets. If
pockets for bone stiffeners were not woven in, they had to be sewn in by hand
before the bones could be inserted, and then finished with additional stitching
to hold the bones in place. Cohn conceived of weaving pockets into the body
of the corset, reducing the necessary finishing work. Because of the hourglass
shape of corsets, the stays varied in length. Therefore, the loom needed not
only to weave pockets, but to weave pockets of predetermined but variable
140. 93 U.S. 366 (1876).
141. Cohn thus could avoid the problematic assertion of loss of working knowledge, an aspect of
the law of corporate intellectual property still in flux during this period. See generally CATHERINE L.
FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE LNTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, 1800-1930 (2009).
142. For the development of the large-scale manufacture of machine-made corsets, see Smith,
supra note 6.
143. Transcript of Deposition of Moritz Cohn, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 8, 46-47.
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length. Using the modem Jacquard looms, which were programmed by means
of punched cards, Cohn was able to produce the corsets he envisioned, and he
received a patent to the improved corset thus produced.1'4 This
accomplishment, however, required the assistance of a succession of two expert
weavers, skilled in punching cards for looms, and the use of paid consulting
services provided by the inventor of an innovative loom, who further modified
his loom for Cohn's purposes. 14 5 It was the loom inventor, James Lyall, who,
together with his brother William, then opened his own corset manufacturing
business, the United States Corset Company, which used the modified looms
James had first designed for Cohn to manufacture woven corsets. 14 6 Cohn,
undoubtedly greatly irritated at this betrayal as well as by the threat to his
business, sued the company and its directors for patent infringement, claiming
that his patent covered the corsets they were making.
The Lyalls successfully defended against the suit at trial by arguing that
Cohn's patent was invalid because his invention was already known.14 7 In fact,
they claimed, it had been fully disclosed in a printed publication, an English
provisional specification filed in the United States patent office in 1854.148 In
considering this argument on appeal, the Justices concentrated their attention
on interpreting Cohn's patent, in order to determine whether his invention had
been disclosed in the English document.
They determined that the English specification was "fatal" to Cohn's patent
because it sufficiently described the corset claimed by Cohn.149 According to
the Court, Cohn, like Frances, was trying to assert a monopoly over something
known to the public. In Cohn's case, the public was the community of weavers
on both sides of the Atlantic, who had learned of the invention from an
Englishman.
On its surface, then, the narrative of Cohn does not appear in any way
unique to the corset business or to have anything to do with gender. Cohn's
masculinity did not save his suit from the same fate as Frances's suit. In each
case, the Court invalidated a corset-related patent because of prior public
knowledge of the invention. In Cohn, the Court did not need to remake the
understanding of "public" in any troubling way, nor did it signal that a few
144. U.S. Patent No. 174,199 (filed Feb. 9, 1876).
145. Testimony of Moritz Cohn, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 47-48 (weaver and
owner); Testimony of Charles Gahren, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 37 (engineer);
Testimony of Louis Langlotz, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 41 (weaver); Testimony of
Gustav Zorn, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 32 (designer); see also Brief for Appellants, in
Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 33-34.
146. Testimony of James Lyall, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 113, 117-18.
147. Decision, reprinted in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 168-74 (Blatchford, J.,
C.C.S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1874).
148. English Patent No. 143, Complainant's Exhibit No. 143, reprinted in Transcript of Record,
supra note 82, at 54.
149. Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 370 (1876).
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years later, it might find that the public could consist of a single intimate friend
of the inventor as much as an international group of skilled workers.
Women's bodies, however, remained significant to how the Cohn case was
argued and decided, even though, as in Egbert, the gendered nature of corset
technology went unacknowledged. The corset as patented technology designed
to shape women's bodies entered the masculine province of the courtroom with
the dual gender valence I described in Part I. It was masculine technology, but
even in the absence of any female actors in the Cohn litigation, the corset
brought femininity into the courtroom. The Court's reasoning, as it compared
the English specification to Cohn's patent, elevated the terms "grace" and
"elegance" to technical terms of art, in an elision of the body to be
encompassed within the corset with the patented corset itself.
2. "Grace" and "Elegance" as Terms ofArt
Cohn argued to the Supreme Court that while the English specification
revealed a corset with pockets for bone stays woven into the corset, unlike in
his improvement, in the English corset, the closed ends of the pockets were all
at "uniform distances from the edge of the corset."150 His improvement, then,
consisted in the ability to vary the length of the pockets, allowing the insertion
of stays of varying length around the perimeter of the corset, which was
necessary for a better fit. The stays in the front of the corset, which had to run
from the swell of the wearer's breasts down to her abdomen, needed to be of a
different length than those along her sides, which ran from under her armpit
over the curve of her hip, and different still from those on her back. The
function of a corset in this period was to emphasize the breasts and hips relative
to the waist, and the resulting hourglass shape would be lost if all stays were
the same length.
The English inventor had failed to mention any variation in pocket length.
Yet, the Court was unpersuaded by Cohn's attempt to read the English
specification so narrowly. Instead, the Court focused on the words of
description in the English document that claimed that the inventor's corset
contained "all the elegance and graceful contour of sewn corsets made by
manual labor."15' "Every person skilled in corset making," declared the Court,
knew that pockets had to be of varying length in order to "preserve a graceful
shape at the top," that is, to emphasize the curve of the wearer's breasts rather
than to flatten them. 15 2 In its analysis of the sufficiency of description in the
English specification, the Court repeated the words "elegance" and "grace"
150. Brief for Appellants, in Transcript of Record, supra note 82, at 3.
151. Cohn, 93 U.S. at 375 (quoting specification).
152. Id. at 376.
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multiple times. 153 According to the Court, these words, as modifying the type
of "contour" the corset was designed to create, were sufficiently specific by
themselves to indicate the use of pockets of multiple lengths. The Court
thereby considered "grace" and "elegance" as terms of art, communicating to
one skilled in the art of corset making the desired contour of the female body
intended to be created by the garment, which, in turn, dictated a particular
variation in stay length.
These words served as coded descriptors for the female body left invisible
in the drawings of the corset within the patent documents. The Justices,
Victorian gentleman all, were relying on an unarticulated trans-Atlantic
conception of the female body, so familiar and unquestioned that it could be
assumed. There may have been no elegantly dressed women in the courtroom,
but the Justices needed no reminder to understand that the ultimate utility of
any corset was in molding the female form itself. "Grace" and "elegance" in
the female form were typified by the silhouette manufactured by an hourglass-
shaped, whalebone-stiffened corset. Further, the Court assumed that this
understanding was shared by English weavers in 1854 and New York corset
makers in 1873, as well as by Supreme Court Justices in 1876.
The Cohn opinion thus reveals the result of male judges applying patent
doctrine to a technology of gender. Corsets may have been feminine
technology, made for use by women, but their purpose was to satisfy the male
gaze, "functioning and signifying for the beholder."1 54 Unlike when assessing
inventions in, for example, telegraphy, the Justices needed no expert testimony
to understand the evidence provided by their male gazes about what constituted
"elegance and [a] graceful" feminine contour. The purpose of corsets, and thus
the utility of patented corsets, was the creation of feminine beauty.' 55 The
corset may have been worn by women, even sometimes invented and
manufactured and sold by women, but in the courtroom, with the all-male
judiciary, it was masculine knowledge of the female body that defined the
patentable contours of this technology.156 As has been noted by Brownmiller
and many other feminist thinkers, femininity and masculinity are not
constructed in isolation by one sex, but are the result of the dynamic interplay
between sexes and gender roles.' 57  The Justices were unselfconsciously
enacting their own masculinity by construing the words of a patent
153. Id.
154. Miller, supra note 39, at 136.
155. Note that some nineteenth-century corsets were considered medical devices designed for
health purposes, thus having a different utility, but one not at issue in Cohn. For a discussion of the use
of corsets to treat scoliosis, see Jane Farrell-Beck, Medical and Commercial Supports for Scoliotic
Patients, 1819-1935, in 11 CADUCEUS: STUD. ANATOMY & TECH. 142 (1995).
156. Cf Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, supra note 19, at 22-23 (considering the
unacknowledged masculine nature of the PHOSITA-Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art-deployed
in patent cases to evaluate inventions).
157. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 236; Joan Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical
Analysis, 91 Am. HIST. REv. 1053, 1054 (1986).
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specification to describe an invention that was constitutive of femininity. They
had, in Brownmiller's words, a "grip on the corset" and its social purpose.
Cohn lost his case because of the hegemonic notion of female beauty that
privileged the male gaze over female comfort, and that guided the Justices'
interpretation of an anticipatory reference. In writing this opinion, the Justices
were enacting gender as well as patent law, both using and creating gendered
knowledge of the corset as technology.
Viewing the corset as patented technology, using gender and sexuality as
analytic foci, thus provides a way of considering the first two elements of
Egbert's strangeness. The historical data about corset patents and litigations
show that to contemporaries Egbert was not odd in its subject matter or its
female plaintiff. Yet, the example of Cohn emphasizes that despite the routine
nature of corset patents and corset patent litigations, the corset was a gendered
technology that carried gendered messages into the courtroom even when
corseted women were not present. Even in the technical area of patent law,
justice was not gender-blind.
PART III. THE CORSET IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
A close reading of the Cohn opinion underscores the reality of law in
action. The all-male judiciary shared and applied Victorian gender assumptions
as it considered corset-related patent cases, as judges assuredly did in all cases.
These assumptions concerned not only what body shape was graceful and
elegant for a woman, but also where women's bodies should be found and what
those bodies did, with specific implications for the patent doctrine the Justices
would consider five years later, when they were asked to construe the "public
use" of a corset invention.
Gender roles in Victorian America were understood by what is often
referred to by historians, although not by Victorians themselves, as the
"ideology of separate spheres." This ideology held nearly hegemonic sway in
the Victorian period. It described a sex-segregated society in which men
engaged in commerce, the business of earning a livelihood, in the public
sphere, and then retreated to the domestic sphere, where their wives and
daughters, angels of the home, used their feminine nature to provide a
welcoming private life.158 The public sphere and its activities and relationships
158. The ideology of separate spheres has been extensively discussed in the historical literature.
See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND,
1780-1835 (1977); Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the
Age ofJackson, I AM. STUD. J. 5 (1969); Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18
AM. Q. 151 (1966). Its relationship to law, particularly family law, has also been extensively explored.
See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1985); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2002);
Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497 (1983).
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were masculine; the private sphere and its activities and relationships were
feminine. This ideology did not reflect reality for most American men and
women, but as an ideology, it was enormously influential in these decades in
shaping how men and women enacted their gender roles. The Supreme Court
had, just a few years before Egbert v. Lippmann, reiterated this ideology as the
law of the land in Bradwell v. Illinois.159 It was this ideology that led the Court
to uphold the right of Illinois to keep Mrs. Myra Bradwell from practicing law.
In that case, Justice Bradley wrote a separate concurrence to note that "the civil
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman."' 6 0
The doctrine of separate spheres, as an ideology, was an inescapable part of
judicial reasoning of the period. It made no difference that judges often
considered cases in which women were active participants in commercial life,
and heard testimony that described many women toiling in factories, rather than
gracing front parlors with their elegant, corset-induced curves. The gendered
assumptions shared by all men of their class and era created a prism through
which judges heard testimony and made decisions. In cases related to corsets,
women were always present-either as witnesses and litigants, or in the bodies
suggested by the shaped garments under consideration.
To complete a feminist analysis of the corset as patented technology, it is
necessary to understand Victorian notions of gender, the shared understandings
of femininity and masculinity, as enacted through dress and activities. It is also
necessary to consider sexuality and women's physical bodies. The American
legal system reflected social understandings of both gender and sexuality,
which surrounded precisely the decisive issue in Egbert-the public and private
roles of the corset. In this Part, I consider the social and legal meanings of the
corset outside of the patent context, to more fully appreciate the ways in which
a corset brought gender and sexuality into American courtrooms.
A. The Dual Nature of Corsets
Both the corset and the ideology of separate spheres were in their heyday
in the late nineteenth century, and this was no chance coincidence. The corset
was in its heyday not just in terms of the number of corset patents issued, but
also in terms of the degree to which the garment was worn by a broad spectrum
of American women, from girls to the elderly, from domestic servants and
factory workers to the Gilded Age heiresses in their New York mansions. The
corset was so popular during the late Victorian era in part because of the ways
in which it supported and was deployed to maintain the ideology of separate
spheres. In many ways, the corset was used to signal the boundary of public
159. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
160. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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and private. That boundary, as interpreted through the ideology of separate
spheres, was a crucial construct for what Summers called "the maintenance of
Victorian hetero-patriarchal dominance."' The spheres were not only
separate, but unequal, with the public masculine sphere dominating the private
feminine sphere in power and importance, and the corset thus reinforced
masculine power and feminine subordination.
The corset played this role through its physical effects and its cultural
meanings. It has been frequently noted that the corset acted as a stand-in for a
woman's body, just as it did in the Cohn opinion.162 With the nineteenth-
century development of the mass-produced corset as a heavily marketed
consumer item, it has been portrayed as such a stand-in in advertisements. 163In
addition to signifying women's bodies, the corset was intended to remake
women's bodies. By emphasizing women's secondary sexual characteristics,
the hourglass corset emphasized female biology, biology that was believed by
many of all classes in the late nineteenth century to limit women's abilities.
Women's bodies, marked by the hips and breasts of childbearing and child-
suckling, were believed to be weaker than men's bodies. Women's biology
thus provided a naturalized explanation for the ideology of separate spheres.
Women were not physically suited for the rough and tumble of public life, or
even for the mental exertion of advanced education. They were suited for
childbearing and rearing, and quiet domestic tasks. Ideology was grounded in
biology. 16
The corset both emphasized this biology and reinforced its social
construction by actually making women's bodies weaker. Corseting could
reduce muscle tone, cause internal injuries, limit mobility, and promote pallor
and fainting in the wearer, all effects that reinforced the contemporary
understanding of women's bodies as weak and unreliable. When women of all
races and social classes wore corsets, they were participating in a mass
enactment of these beliefs, emphasizing their femininity. They were also
suggesting that they were lady-like, implying not only a gender role, but also a
class role. The ideology of separate spheres and the cult of true womanhood
focused on the non-wage-earning middle-class white woman as the feminine
ideal.165  A corseted body, which made movement more difficult, signaled
161. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 8.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 178-79; see also Finch, supra note 35, at 347-48.
164. Rima D. Apple, Introduction, in WOMEN, HEALTH & MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL
HANDBOOK, at xiii, xvi (Rima D. Apple ed., 1990) ("[Nineteenth-century] physicians, commentators
and women themselves wrote as if women ... were sickly."); see also EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN
EDUCATION; OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE GlRLS (1873) (arguing that education was dangerous for girls
and women).
165. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore further how the issues of gender and sexuality
surrounding the corset were crosscut by considerations of class and race. This area of fashion history
has been touched upon, but not yet fully researched. See STEELE, supra note 5, at 48-49; SUMMERS,
supra note 5, at 9-36.
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leisure. In his famous work The Theory of the Leisure Class, contemporary
observer Thorstein Veblen characterized the corset as "a mutilation, undergone
for the purpose of lowering the subject's vitality and rendering her permanently
and obviously unfit for work."166
It is worth stressing again that this understanding of women's biology and
social role, and its promotion by widespread corset use, bore little relationship
to the actual lives of many women, who, while wearing corsets, engaged in
significant physical labor, including both unpaid labor within their own homes
and wage labor. A corset could be more or less restrictive depending on its
style and how tightly it was laced. The corset allowed working-class women to
appear as if their bodies were more ornamental than useful, even as they relied
on their own labor for economic survival.
The corset also signaled sexuality, both in its role as a stand-in for the
unclothed body within it, and in the way it reshaped the female body. By
pushing up the breasts and exposing them to the male gaze, and creating a
silhouette that men of the period could find graceful and elegant, the corset
allowed women to display their bodies attractively, as part of the quest for a
husband. By the 1880s, this message was so explicit that the Warren Corset
Company used "A True Story" in four chapters as an illustrated advertisement,
showing a woman despairing at her figure in her old corset, replacing her corset
with an improved model, obtaining admiring glances from men, and then
appearing at the altar, a tightly corseted bride in white.16 7
The corset was a safe and controlled way of signaling sexuality because the
corset also confined female flesh, displaying cleavage, a wasp waist, and
rounded hips, but rendering most of the body inaccessible behind a carapace. It
prevented any visible jiggling that would reveal the flesh beneath the bones and
steels. The body was displayed to the male gaze as a sexual object, but was
protected from access. A corseted body necessarily maintained a stiff and
upright posture, suggestive of rigid morality and restraint. Conversely, the
failure to wear corsets was associated with moral looseness. An unbound
female body in public was threatening, suggesting an indifference to the male
gaze, or worse, an unrestrained sexuality. As Summers has quipped, Victorian
women were "bound to please."' 68
The social dictate to be corseted in public was part of the way the corset
acted to signify the boundaries between public and private spheres. Corsets
were worn under clothes, and were to remain unseen. The degree to which
corsets were intended to be seen can be assessed by the balance struck in these
166. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN EcoNOMIC STUDY OF
INSTrruTIONS 172 (1912) (1899).
167. Advertisement reproduced in STEELE, supra note 5, at 134.
168. The understanding of feminine sexuality as dangerous is not confined to the nineteenth
century. See Adler, supra note 36, at 1109 (describing how the cultural view of the "seductive,
dangerous, writhing woman" influenced twenty-first-century First Amendment law).
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garments between functionality and ornamentation. While corsets have been
made in many colors and fabrics, and decorated with embroidery and lace, by
the second half of the nineteenth century, mass-produced corsets were most
commonly prosaic garments, white, with little or no ornamentation. This
utilitarian appearance reflected both their purchase price and their private
nature.16 9  Cheap ornamentation was part of the ready-to-wear world of
women's fashion, with many working-class women investing their wages in
embellished hats and gloves and dresses. But for those on limited incomes, the
expenditure on decoration did not extend to the corset.'70 The corset was not
for public display.
Yet just as the corset had a double gender valence as patented technology,
it had a dual nature as a garment with respect to the public/private divide,
making it an ideal boundary marker. It was a private garment with a public
role.17 1 While unseen in public, the corset created the public form of the female
body. The very purpose of the garment was to attract the male gaze in public.
In public, the corset invisibly surrounded the woman's body, molding its
presentation, and only in private could the corset be removed, allowing the
unbound body to return to its natural state. The presence or absence of a corset
thus acted as a signal, indicating both the moral character of the wearer and the
nature of the space she was inhabiting. In public spaces in which public
relationships occurred, women should be corseted. In such places, like the
street, places of amusement, shops, and other homes, an uncorseted woman
signaled that she was unable, due to extreme poverty, or unwilling to strive for
a middle-class ideal of femininity.172 Depending on circumstances, she might
also be signaling that her body was public, sexually available for money or
otherwise.173 In other words, that she was a trollop, with its mixed meaning of
slatternly and promiscuous. On the other hand, a woman of any means could
signal that she was socially proper and morally upright, by removing her corset
only in private spaces, in which private familial relationships occurred. The
only men present in such spaces were to be children and husbands, and perhaps
brothers and medical doctors. If the corset was removed, its wearer was
169. STEELE, supra note 5, at 39 (explaining that corsets until 1870 were almost always white);
SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 14-15. Note that the bridal corset analyzed by Miller had some
ornamentation, and was "near the top of the Royal Worcester [Corset Company's] line," costing over
three times as much as the most basic corset the company sold. Miller, supra note 39, at 136.
170. As the ready-to-wear revolution made trims less expensive, e.g., machine-made lace, cheaper
corsets once again began to show more embellishment. See advertisements in STEELE, supra note 5, at
44-65; SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 178-99. For a general discussion of working-class women's dress at
the turn of the twentieth century, see KATHY PEISS, CHEAP AMUSEMENTS: WORKING WOMEN AND
LEISURE IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY NEW YORK 62 (1986).
171. Miller, supra note 39, at 136-37.
172. Some women, for reasons of comfort, health, or philosophy, including some active in the
cause of women's rights, rejected the corset. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 144-48.
173. While the removal of a corset in a public space could signal sexual availability, as discussed
further infra, I do not mean to suggest that prostitutes routinely went uncorseted. Such women also had
reason to attract the male gaze.
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signaling that she was in an intimate, private space, accessible only to family
members and sanctioned sexual partners.
The world, of course, is not readily divided into public and private spaces.
The ideology of separate spheres can lead us to overlook the complexity in the
daily living of men and women, and the gradations that occur.174 Women were
subject to categorization not only by where they were found, and what they
were wearing, but also by their class, race, and age. Within these confines,
however, they could, by donning or removing a corset, transform a space from
public to private, or reconfigure the meaning of their relationship to any man
present. As a technology of gender, corsets in the Victorian era also acted as a
marker of the gendered divide between public and private.
B. The Corset as Witness
These mixed meanings of the corset to signal femininity, sexual
availability and attractiveness, and moral constraint were well known to
Americans of the period. Thus, corsets could figure in non-patent lawsuits as
stand-ins for the gender conformity and sexual activities of women. The
Supreme Court Justices, like all judges, were products of their time. They
understood and participated in the replication of the ideology of separate
spheres, both in their professional life and in their personal lives. They also
understood the meanings of corsets as a symbol both of femininity and of
female sexuality. They understood those meanings not just as Victorians, but
as lawyers and judges. The legal system in the nineteenth century had
incorporated the corset as a form of witness when a case turned on a woman's
sexual activities, routinely giving it evidentiary weight.
In 1876, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court considered an
appeal by a man and woman from their conviction for adultery, which they
denied committing.175 They had been found in a hotel room at midnight. The
man was in the bed, and the woman was not, and was fully clothed, except for
her corset and shoes. Her uncorseted presence was considered probative of an
adulterous purpose in their visit to the hotel. Similarly, in 1885 when an Iowa
woman was found in a bedroom with a man not her husband, wearing a "loose"
wrapper, with her hair hanging "loosely," and her corset lying on the bed, her
general state of physical looseness and her removal of her constraining corset
were considered evidence of loose morals sufficient to prove adultery.' 76 In
cross-actions for divorce, the evidence of her corset helped the husband
174. Susan Gal, A Semiotics of the Public/Private Distinction, 13 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST
CuLTuRAL STuD. 77, 78-79 (2002).
175. Comm. v. Bowers, 121 Mass. 45, 45-46 (1876).
176. Names v. Names, 25 N.W. 671, 671-72 (Iowa 1885).
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establish himself as the wronged party. 17 7 In each of these cases, in the absence
of eyewitness testimony of suspected sexual activity, the corset bore witness.
The removal of a woman's corset transformed the presumption that an
unmarried man and woman were public acquaintances into a presumption that
their relationship was within the private sphere, a sphere that included not only
feminine domesticity, but also sexuality.
Only a few years after the Egbert decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
matter-of-factly concluded that evidence that a man gave a corset to a woman
was evidence that would have led a jury to believe that there had been a sexual
relationship between the pair.178 The man in question had been accused of
bastardy, the crime of fathering an illegitimate child by the woman to whom he
gave the corset. At his initial trial he had denied any sexual relationship, and
then was tried and convicted of perjury for his denial in the face of the evidence
of the corset. 17 9 The appellate court agreed that the evidence that "[]he
purchase of the [corset], and giving it to [the woman], was a circumstance
which, unexplained, was likely to prejudice the case of the defendant in the
minds of the jury . . ,,180
This case reveals the extent of the corset's power as a witness. The corset
merely as a topic of conversation or an item of exchange could also testify to a
private relationship. The Supreme Court heard the Egbert case with full
awareness of the way the Victorian corset produced femininity through its
graceful contours and of the way it signaled sexual interactions between men
and women. The Egbert case involved not only a patent, but the relationship
between the male inventor, Samuel, and his "intimate friend," Frances, who
first wore his innovative corset steel, and later, came to control Samuel's
patent. The corset in the case was not only the result of Samuel's knowledge
creation as an act of invention, but also itself generated knowledge about a
male/female interaction. As the Court considered the nature of public and
private use of a patented invention, it did so in the context of the gendered
divide between public and private spaces policed by the corset itself.
PART IV. FRANCES EGBERT AND THE BARNES PATENT
To understand how this layered epistemology of the corset led to the
expansive interpretation of the public use doctrine in Egbert, I describe the
procedural history and litigated facts of the case. For Frances, Egbert was not a
one-time effort, but the latest in a succession of patent infringement suits
brought as part of her business strategy. Egbert began in September 1874,
177. Id; see also Graham v. Graham, 50 A. 701, 701 (N.J. Ch. 1892) (finding the removal of
corsets in presence of alleged lover as evidence of the wife's adultery).
178. Maynard v. People, 25 N.E. 740, 744 (Ill. 1890).
179. Id. at 741.
180. Id. at 744 (finding error in failure to allow the defendant to explain why he bought the corset).
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when Frances sued Lippmann and Seligmann, corset steel manufacturers in
New York City, for infringement of Samuel's patent.181 The case was finally
resolved at the trial level in the defendants' favor in 1878,182 whereupon
Frances appealed to the Supreme Court. What the Supreme Court opinion does
not reveal, but what is disclosed in the case files of the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York, is that Frances had been using the patent
system and the courts to extract value from the patent almost from the moment
of its issuance in 1866. Her loss in 1881 followed at least a decade of more
successful maneuverings. While Samuel showed a reluctance to involve
himself with the patent system, his widow and executrix moved aggressively to
commercialize his invention. Just as the Egbert case was one of many corset
patent litigations of these decades, it was one of several that Frances herself had
brought.
A. Reissues and Early Litigation
Like Cohn, Frances wielded her patent against her competitors. Within a
year of gaining control of the patent as executrix of Samuel's estate, Frances
went into the business of manufacturing and selling corset steels in New York
City in partnership with George Cruttenden, Jr.183 At about that time, Frances
began to use the legal system to reduce competition from other area corset steel
manufacturers. Frances began by using the nineteenth-century practice of
reissue to adjust the patent issued to Samuel. Under the then-broad
interpretation of the statutory right to correct errors in patents, patent claims
could be revised to correct insufficiency, broadening them to cover subject
matter included in the invention, but left out of the claims. 184  Reissuance
practice made patents very changeable documents during this period, allowing
a patent-holder to easily react to the market. Frances took full advantage of this
ability, and obtained three reissues of the patent between May 1868 and August
1869. 1 In the fall of 1869, Frances wielded her third reissue offensively,
filing a suit for patent infringement against Ferdinand Straus. Straus attempted
to defeat the patent by arguing that Samuel was not the first inventor of the
181. Bill of Complaint, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 1.
182. Egbert v. Lippmann, 8 F. Cas. 370 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878).
183. Articles of Co-partnership, Barnes & Cruttenden, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at
156-58. Barnes & Cruttenden as a manufacturer of steels was included in a New York City directory in
1872. 85 TROW'S NEW YORK CITY DIRECTORY FOR THE YEAR ENDING MAY 1, 1872, at 64 (H. Wilson
comp., 1872). Frances may have later changed partners, because in 1874, certain remarks were
attributed to "Egbert & Lum, successors to Barnes & Cruttenden." Transcript of Record, supra note 54,
at 35.
184. Patent Act of July 3, 1832, § 3, 4 Stat. 559. The interpretation and use of reissue is explained
in Kendall J. Dood, Pursuing the Essence of Inventions: Reissuing Patents in the 19th Century, 32
TECH. & CULTURE 999 (1991).
185. U.S. Patent Reissue No. 3624 (issued Aug. 31, 1869); U.S. Patent Reissue No. 3520 (issued
June 29, 1869); U.S. Patent Reissue No. 2929 (issued May 12, 1868).
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improved corset steel, but Straus was unsuccessful. Judge Samuel Blatchford
made a careful analysis of Samuel's invention, which consisted of a pair of
steels that fastened together. Each steel itself was composed of two pieces of
metal permanently joined together in order to allow them to slide a bit
vertically with respect to each other, but not to slip apart laterally.' The steels
were also tapered to fit the curves of a corset. Blatchford found that Samuel's
invention was novel, and was not anticipated by a carriage-spring or a French
corset spring as Straus had argued. Straus was permanently enjoined from
infringing the patent.' 87
Emboldened by her success, Frances continued to litigate.' After
concluding her case against Straus, she filed complaints on April 30, 1872
against two separate groups of corset manufacturers, Bardwell, Castle & Co.
and Jacobs, Strouse & Co.' 89 Each group of defendants filed an answer, but no
further action was taken in either case. Instead, Frances returned to the patent
office for two further reissues, obtained in November 1872 and January
1873.190 Armed with a reshaped patent, Frances almost immediately asserted
her fifth reissued patent on January 23, 1873 against the Castle firm, now doing
business as S.A. Castle & Co.191
Although the firms of Jacobs, Strouse & Co. and S.A. Castle & Co. were
separate entities, they evidently shared a common supplier of corset steels, who
managed the defense in both cases. The suit against Jacobs, Strouse & Co. was
allowed to languish, when all counsel agreed to abide by the ruling in the re-
filed Egbert v. Castle litigation.192 The Castle case was hotly fought, with
extensive testimony taken from witnesses in New York, Connecticut, and
Pennsylvania. The defense against Frances's patent was managed by
Alexander Mayer, the husband of Rebecca Mayer, a partner in Jacobs, Strouse
& Co., together with a Mr. Phillip Marston of Philadelphia. Marston, whom
186. Barnes v. Straus, 2 F. Cas. 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872).
187. Id. at 877-78.
188. This summary is based on the facts recited in the record of Egbert v. Lippmann, 8 F. Cas. 370
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878), and Egbert v. Castle, and a review of the Docket Book for the Circuit Court for
the Southern District of New York from Oct. 1872 to Nov. 1874, National Archives, New York, New
York. It may not be exhaustive. There is reference to another injunction obtained by Frances against
Parker Bros. & Co., manufacturers of the "climax steel," although I have not found records of the case.
Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 241.
189. The suits were filed not against the firms, but against the individual partners. The firm names
were used in the deposition testimony of Joseph Sturges, Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 102-03.
By the 1880s, Jacobs, Strouse & Co. may have become the Strouse-Adler Company. See Smith, supra
note 6, at 97.
190. U.S. Patent No. 5216 (issued Jan. 7, 1873); U.S. Patent Reissue No. 5130 (issued Nov. 5,
1872). Evidently, the only difference between the fourth and fifth reissues was Frances's- last name: the
1872 reissue had been granted to Frances Barnes, and as she was now Frances Egbert, she sought
another reissuance to correct her name. Bill of Complaint, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 3.
191. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 102.
192. Id. at 19. After the answer, there were no further filings in the Jacobs, Strouse & Co. case,
which was formally dismissed only in 1918. Equity Docket, C.C.S.D.N.Y., Vol. 6 (Oct. 1872 to Sept.
1874).
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Alexander Mayer later described as the "actual party in interest,"1 93 was a
member of the firm of Disston, Marston & Co., corset steel manufacturers. The
Castle defendants used two prominent New York patent law firms, Keller &
Blake, and Thomas P. How. Frances was represented in the Castle litigation,
as in all her other cases, by George Gifford.
The parties took over fifty depositions, as the defendants sought to prove
that Samuel's invention had been anticipated by other corset steels in previous
use. If they could show anticipation, the patent would be invalid. Alexander
Mayer characterized the defense as taking "months of time, and thousands of
dollars, to procure all the evidence that could be got."l 94 The parties had filed
their proofs with the court in preparation for final hearing in the spring of 1874,
when the defendants became convinced, according to Mayer, that their
evidence was not going to be sufficient to prove patent invalidity, leading to a
settlement of the case.19 5 The parties appeared before Judge Blatchford, and
Blatchford issued a decree in May 1874 stating that Reissue Patent No. 5216
was valid, was infringed by the Castle defendants, and that the defendants
owed Frances their profits, damages, and the costs of litigation.196 Pursuant to
the settlement, Jacobs, Strouse & Co. was granted a license, and began paying
semi-annual license fees to Frances.197
Frances, or her firm, had a circular printed, which was sent in the form of a
letter from Jacobs, Strouse & Co. to its customers,' 98 notifying them that:
After a long and protracted struggle between Messrs. S.A. Castle &
Co., of New York, defendants and Frances Lee Egbert, also of this
city, plaintiff, his honor, Judge Blatchford, sustained the validity of the
Egbert patent and rendered a decree whereby all corset-clasps
composed of two or more plates are an infringement upon said
patent. 99
The letter further explained that the firm now had a license covering its
"everlasting" corset clasps, and included a copy of the decree, and a signed
endorsement by Frances certifying that Jacobs, Strouse & Co. held a license to
the "Egbert patent."200
193. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 19.
194. Id.
195. Id
196. Decree of May 15, 1874, Egbert v. Castle, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 34-35.
197. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 22, 29-30.
198. Id. at 28.
199. Id. at 35-36.
200. Id.
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B. Egbert v. Lippmann, Twice
During the Castle litigation, Frances's counsel had taken the testimony of
Phillip Lippmann about his involvement in corset making in New York. 20 1
Frances or her lawyer evidently identified Lippmann and his partner, August
Seligmann as good targets and/or as dangerous competition, for in the fall of
1874, Frances filed two complaints against the men, the first a suit alleging
violation of her trademark in "Cantbreakem" corset steels, and the second, the
patent infringement suit that was eventually heard by the Supreme Court.
Lippmann and Seligmann sold hoop skirts, bustles, and corset steels,
including a model described as the "patent Cantbustem corset steels."202 The
steels were inscribed with the Cantbustem trademark, and the partnership had a
sign on the outside of its place of business, twenty-two feet long and one foot
203
high, which displayed the Cantbustem trademark. To provide evidence for
the patent suit against Lippmann and Seligmann, Frances's then-husband,
Wesley Egbert, sent a clerk, Edward Le Seur, to buy corset steels from P.
Lippmann & Co. Le Seur paid $1.12 for one dozen "plain double steels" and
$2.00 for one dozen "patent adjustable" steels. 204
1. The Testimony
The parties in Egbert agreed to re-use the testimony taken in the Castle
litigation, and the bulk of the record in Egbert is composed of that earlier
deposition testimony. The defendants also redeposed many of the earlier
witnesses and added more, including some of the Castle defendants, as well as
acquaintances of Lippmann, brought to rebut Frances's allegation that
Lippmann was a notorious patent-infringer and scoundrel, whose word as a
businessman could not be trusted.205
201. Testimony of Phillip Lippmann, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 197-203.
202. Like corsets, hoop skirts-frames for holding out a lady's skirt which fastened around the
waist-and bustles-padding worn at the small of the back, also under a skirt-were technologies of
ladies' undergarments routinely worn by women of the period and also frequently patented by the late
nineteenth century. See EWING, supra note 65.
203. The trademark suit was evidently also litigated, although the final proofs offered for judgment
have not survived in the court records. This suit was dismissed in 1878. Equity Docket, C.C.S.D.N.Y.,
Vol. 6 (Oct. 1872 to Sept. 1874).
204. Transcript of Deposition of Edward C. Le Seur, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 13;
Exhibit C, Bill from Lippmann & Co., in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 14. The word "patent"
could have referred to the patent issued to Phillip Lippmann in 1873, supra note 123, although that
patent was never introduced into evidence in either of the suits.
205. The list of witnesses for the defense is provided at Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 1-2.
The following defense witnesses had not testified in Castle: Samuel A. Castle, Henry Ten Broeck,
Bernard Adler, George Sanderson, John H.N. Glassford, Herman Ury, William E. Stein, Joseph
Lehman, Louis Borchard, Charles Eichler, George E. Batcheller, Henry Schwarz, Henry S. Hawke, Max
Rosenstock, G.W. Lockwood, L. Rothschild, Thomas Robinson, Edwin B. Stimpson and August
Seligmann.
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Frances and her attorneys deposed only four witnesses, none of whom had
testified previously. These were Le Seur, the clerk who bought the steels;
Alexander Mayer, who testified as described about the earlier litigation and its
resolution; Wesley Egbert; and Frances herself. Unlike all the other witnesses,
who were deposed in an attorney's office, Frances was deposed in her home,
where she was lying in bed.206 During the few hours of her deposition, Frances
testified that as of that time, December 1875, she had not left her home for two
months, except for medical treatment, and had been told just the day before by
her doctor that "unless I was very quiet and my mind kept perfectly at ease ...
I would not live thirty days." 207 Having thus established herself as a frail
woman, not to be disturbed by aggressive questioning, Frances under direct
examination by her own counsel provided the most complete narrative of
Samuel's invention in the record. The narrative recounted in the Supreme
Court opinion is based almost exclusively on her testimony.
Frances described the original scene in which Samuel was privy to a
conversation between Frances and her friend, Miss Cregier, about their corset
issues, in which the women complained that "we could not keep a pair of plain
steels in our corsets without breaking," and testified about two pairs of steels
208Samuel had given her, one in 1855, and another in 1858. Frances also
related that Samuel had made another pair, in about 1863, for a Mrs. Bower, "to
try the effect on a very stout lady."209 No one, Frances averred, other than
herself, Miss Cregier (now dead), and Mrs. Bower had any knowledge of
Samuel's innovative steels.210
Frances also testified as to Samuel's activities and state of mind between
the time of his invention and his patent application. She stated that while
Samuel had "always intended to patent" his invention, "from the time I knew
him until the time he died he was always sick with consumption, poor, and low-
spirited and in trouble."2 1 1 In 1855, because of his illness, "[h]e did not attend
to any active business," but may have had "some interest in something in
California."212 In addition to the steels, Samuel made other models of
inventions which he hoped to patent, but never did.213  Despite her
characterization of Samuel as ill and destitute, Frances married him in 1863.
After their marriage, Samuel finally "nerve[d] himself to patent [the improved
steels]," Frances testified, "in the hope of leaving something, as he thought, for
206. Transcript of Deposition of Frances Egbert, Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 14-15.
207. Id. at 15. Note that Frances remained alive to post an appeal bond in October, 1878. Transcript
of Record, supra note 54, at 256. I have not found her death certificate.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 17.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 18.
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my support."214 He applied for the patent in March 1866, received it in July,
and was dead by August, leaving a will dated the day before his death leaving
his estate to Frances, as his sole devisee and executrix.215
Several witnesses in the Castle litigation corroborated Frances's testimony
about Samuel and his activities. Joseph Sturges, the former baggage master at
the Fairfield, Connecticut station of the New York & New Haven Railroad,
testified that he met Samuel on a train in 1863, somewhere along the line in
Connecticut. Sturges, on the lookout for a business opportunity, was
sufficiently intrigued by Samuel's description of his inventions to visit the
Barnes' home in New York, where Samuel showed him a leather tanning
216invention. Sturges testified that Samuel apologized for not having a set of
steels to show him, having given out his sample a few days earlier (perhaps to
Mrs. Bower). At Samuel's request, Frances, by then his wife, left the room,
removed her corset, and returned with it to the room. There she used scissors
to rip open the corset and remove the steels-the only way that they could be
viewed.217
Mr. Bower, Samuel's landlord and husband to the stout Mrs. Bower, also
testified about the steels. According to Bower, Samuel was living in Bower's
home as a boarder in 1862, and brought Frances there to live in 1863 after their
marriage. Mr. Bower testified that Samuel was "getting up" the steels in his
bedroom, working with samples in wood or paper as well as metal, and that he
218gave Mrs. Bower a pair. Mr. Bower refused to agree with the suggestion of
counsel that the steels were not yet completed, instead testifying that "[h]e
showed me the full operation of the steels." 219 By 1866, Samuel allegedly told
Mr. Bower that he intended to patent the steels, but had not done so yet due to
his sickness.220
The record in the case suggests that this patent, as managed by Frances in
her widowhood, formed the basis of a business to support her, and by 1875, her
new husband as well. Wesley Egbert testified that he was thirty-three years old
and unemployed, although actively engaged in supporting Frances's
litigation.221 Under cross-examination, Wesley was forced to admit that he was
younger than his wife, although his attempt to estimate the age difference at
"about 6 years" was perhaps more kind than accurate when he also testified that
214. Id.
215. Will of Samuel H. Barnes, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 158-59. Israel Bower
testified that Samuel died August 9, 1866. Transcript of Deposition of Israel Bower, in Transcript of
Record, supra note 54, at 111.
216. This invention, described as patented, was also specifically left to Frances in Samuel's will.
Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 158-59.
217. Transcript of Deposition of Joseph Sturges, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 98.
218. Transcript of Deposition of Israel Bower, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 110-11.
219. Id. at 112.
220. Id. at 111.
221. Transcript of Deposition of Wesley Egbert, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 31-33.
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222
she was probably "a little more than" thirty-nine years old. Frances herself,
during her sickbed deposition, was not asked any awkward questions about her
age or employment.
2. The Judicial Opinions
Back before Samuel Blatchford, the same judge who had presided over the
Castle litigation, and armed with Frances's testimony, her attorney, Gifford,
argued that because the patent had already been judged valid in Straus and
Castle, the only issue was its infringement, which had been proved.223 In their
answer, the defendants concentrated their argument on the alleged prior use of
the claimed invention by other corset makers.224 It was presumably the
testimony about the extensive use of various sorts of double or otherwise
reinforced steels in Castle that led Gifford to put forward Frances as a witness
to provide evidence that Samuel had invented his steels considerably before he
filed his application in 1866.
Judge Blatchford apparently surprised Frances's counsel by deciding the
case on grounds not emphasized by the defendants. Instead of focusing on the
testimony designed to show the manufacture and use of reinforced steels by
other manufacturers and corset makers in New York and Connecticut,
Blatchford turned Frances's own testimony against her. He declared that under
settled law, even the "original and first inventor of the thing patented" is not
entitled to a patent if the invention was in public use more than two years
before the date of the application, as long as the invention was "in such
condition that he can apply for a patent for it." Any patent issued in violation
of these conditions was void.225 The judge reviewed the use by Frances, the use
by Mrs. Bower, and the display of the steels to Sturges after Frances removed
them from her corset.226 The judge found these uses to be "sufficient public
use." According to Blatchford, "[i]t was not a use for experiment, or a use in
222. Id. at 33. Wesley also testified that he was not sure of Frances's birthplace, which may have
been New York or Jersey City, and that her surname was Willis before she married Barnes. It is unclear
whether the name "Lee" which Frances used with both her married names of Barnes and Egbert was her
given middle name, or yet another surname from another stage of her life. The marriage certificate
between Wesley and Frances gives her name as Frances Lee Barnes, her maiden name as Willis, and her
birthplace as New London, Connecticut.
223. In its opinion, the Supreme Court readily agreed that the Cantbustem steels infringed Samuel's
patent, as reissued. Egbert v. Lippmann, 93 U.S. 333, 334 (1881).
224. Answer of Defendants, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 5-11. These
characterizations of the arguments in the Circuit Court are based on a careful reading of the pleadings,
examination, and cross-examination of witnesses in deposition (the case was tried without in-court
testimony), and the Supreme Court briefs. The briefs below, although referenced in the Supreme Court
briefs, are not recorded in the Circuit Court docket, or included in the surviving files of the Circuit
Court.
225. Decree of Sept. 26, 1878, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 253-54; see also Egbert v.
Lippmann, 8 F. Cas. 370, 370-71 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878).
226. Egbert, 8 F.Cas. at 370.
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private or a private use. It was a practical use in public of the completed
article. No secrecy was maintained or enjoined as to the article or its
structure."227
The parties evidently had not been in a hurry to have the case heard, for
despite concluding depositions in December 1875, it was the fall of 1878 when
Blatchford heard argument and issued his ruling. He dismissed the bill of
complaint, with costs to be paid by Frances. On appeal, both parties returned to
arguing the case as they understood it to be framed by the pleadings. Counsel
for Lippmann and Seligmann noted the "characteristic sagacity" with which
Blatchford had found "undisputed evidence" "in the testimony of plaintiff
herself and her witnesses" "which is fatal to the patent" by showing "a public
use with consent of the patentee, more than two years before his
application."228 But they also noted the "other numerous questions raised and
large amount of evidence" they had brought to show prior public use from
independent sources.229 Twenty pages of their twenty-seven page brief were
devoted to that evidence, and they wasted no space arguing about Frances's
testimony, indicating which argument they thought was strongest.
Frances's counsel230 were more forthright about attempting to redirect the
Court's attention. They began their brief by arguing that while "the sole
ground" for decision was "that complainant's own proof showed a public use,"
"[t]his point does not appear to have been considered or mooted, save only in
the opinion of the Court."231 Just in case the Supreme Court missed this point,
after enumerating the errors in the opinion below, counsel again reminded the
Court that "[t]he point on which the Circuit Court decided this cause, was not
considered in the argument below."232
Faced with this unexpected use of Frances's testimony, counsel decided to
rely on Gifford's Circuit Court brief for its analysis of the defendants'
arguments and evidence, and used the Supreme Court brief to attempt to undo
the damaging construction that had been placed on Frances's testimony.
Counsel asserted that the use by Frances and Mrs. Bower, and the showing to
Sturges, was "a mere experimental private use."233 By that phrasing, counsel
were trying to make several arguments at once.
They were trying to fit Samuel's actions over the eleven years between
1855 and 1866 into the experimental use exception to the statutory bar. In the
recent case of City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co.,234 the
Court had termed a six-year very public and for-profit use of wooden pavement
227. Id at 371.
228. Brief for Appellees, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 6.
229. Id.
230. Frances's appeal was taken by J.C. Clayton and A.Q. Keasbey of New York City.
231. Brief for Appellant, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 1.
232. Id. at 2.
233. Id. at 1.
234. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
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on a toll road in Boston to be experimental use, and therefore not a bar to a later
patent. Samuel's steels were evidently substantially complete by 1855, and by
Frances's own testimony, Samuel believed them to be ready for patenting
during the long period of her use. The City of Elizabeth case, however, had
turned on a need to test the durability of the novel pavers under actual
conditions, a set of facts that could be easily transferred to Samuel's invention.
The use in Frances's and Mrs. Bower's corsets could be viewed as allowing
Samuel to test the endurance of his steels, compared to other, easily broken
steels, both on a woman of normal figure (Frances) and the "very stout" Mrs.
Bower. Frances's counsel quoted extensively from City of Elizabeth in their
brief.235
Counsel also focused on the word "public" in the statute, by characterizing
the invisible use by Frances and Mrs. Bower as "private" use. Because the
statute quoted by Judge Blatchford also banned patents upon "proof of
abandonment of such invention to the public," 236 counsel argued that there was
not sufficient proof of abandonment in this case, based on the lack of public
knowledge of the invention, given the very limited circle of those who knew of
it, and Samuel's stated intention to pursue a patent as soon as health and
finances would allow.23 7
Unlike the defendants' brief, which focused almost exclusively on the
facts, Frances's counsel marshaled considerable legal precedent to remind the
Court of prior cases suggesting that the statutory bar created by public use was
only to be raised against an inventor in clear circumstances. Quoting from
Mellus v. Silsbee,23 8 a Circuit Court of Massachusetts opinion authored by then-
Judge Story, counsel reminded the Court:
[A]cts of an inventor . . . are to be liberally construed as acts of an
experimental character, nor is the inventor to be estopped by allowing
a few persons to use his invention to ascertain its utility, or by any
such acts of use or indulgence to others to use the same, as are not
inconsistent with the clear intention to hold the exclusive privilege,
and to secure the same by letters patent.239
They added the opinion of the contemporary Treatise on the Law of
Patents, by George Ticknor Curtis, that "the inference that [the inventor]
intends to surrender the invention to the public" is "never favored, nor will it, in
general, be sufficient to prove such a defense, unless it appear that the use,
exercise, or practice of the invention was somewhat extensive and for the
235. Brief for Appellant, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 20-24.
236. Egbert v. Lippmann, 8 F. Cas. at 370 (quoting Patent Act of Mar. 3, 1839, § 7, 5 Stat. 354).
237. Brief for Appellant, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 24.
238. 16 F. Cas. 1332 (C.C. Mass. 1825).
239. Brief for Appellant, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 18.
104 [Vol. 23:57
Getting a Grip on the Corset
purpose of gain, evincing an intent on the part of the inventor to secure the
exclusive benefits of his invention without applying for the protection of letters
patent."240 In other words, when an inventor attempted to exploit an invention
commercially and then sought a patent, perhaps after a failure to keep it as a
trade secret, he would run afoul of the public use bar. The record in Egbert was
devoid of any suggestion either that Samuel had allowed the "extensive" use of
his steels, or that he had done so "for the purpose of gain." Rather, his
allowing his "intimate friend" to use a pair of steels for eleven years might fall
into the category of what Story had called "such acts of peculiar indulgence and
use as may fairly consist with the clear intention to hold the exclusive
privilege."241
Indeed, counsel argued: "The use of a corset steel, concealed in the dress,
by two intimate friends of different figures, for a short time, could never have
been held to be a public use depriving the inventor of his rights." 242 Samuel,
far from abandoning his invention, "tested it in the only way possible for such
an article, and to the most limited extent consistent with his object. 243 As they
noted, "He could not try it on himself."244 Further, the use was so private and
discreet that "[s]o far from being public was [the use], that when he proposed to
sell his invention, just before his patent was obtained, he had to get his wife to
rip it from her corset to exhibit it."245
As well as marshalling earlier case law suggesting that courts should be
hesitant to find a public use bar, and should only do so in cases in which the
inventor benefited financially from the use, Frances's counsel confronted the
issues of gender and sexuality in the case more directly than did the Justices to
whom they argued. Counsel argued that the law could not mean to penalize
Samuel for actions that a married man could have carried out with impunity.
Frances's counsel argued that it was obvious that if Samuel had tried his steels
"for any length of time" on his wife and daughter, "it could not have been
deemed a public use." 246 Those female bodies, bound to a husband and father
through legal ties creating male authority, were obviously within the private
circle of a family. This argument was based on the legal assumptions
underlying the doctrine of coverture, an ancient English doctrine denying
unmarried women and wives any legal standing. Although the passage of
240. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS AS
ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §389 (3d ed. 1867), as quoted in
Brief for Appellant, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 20.
241. Brief for Appellant, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 20 (citation omitted).
242. Id. at 25.
243. Id. at 24.
244. Id. at 26.
245. Id. at 27.
246. Id.
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Married Women's Property Acts during the nineteenth century had begun to
limit this doctrine, these underlying assumptions were still quite strong.247
In an argument evidently persuasive to the dissenting Justice Miller,
Frances's counsel argued that the unfortunate lack of a legally recognized
relationship between Frances and Samuel in 1855 should not be able to
redesignate Frances's undergarments from the private sphere of the home and
family into the public sphere of commerce. It was unfair, they argued, that
because Frances was merely an "intimate friend," and only later a wife, Judge
Blatchford had termed her use to be "public." Frances's counsel did not take
advantage of testimony in the record to show that Samuel was not the only
unmarried male inventor in the area of corsetry who gave an invention to a
woman to try in her corset. 24 8 Edward Cargill, who was thirteen years old and
working in his father's shop in Waterbury, Connecticut, made a pair of double
corset steels in 1863, according to his mother and father.24 9 In the presence of
his mother, his father gave them to a Miss Eliza Doolittle who was living in
their home while seeking work as a teacher.2 50 According to the recollection of
both Cargill parents ten years later, Miss Doolittle sewed the steels into her
corsets and wore the steels for "three or four weeks" "as a test."251 Similarly,
the patentee John Fitzpatrick, who was also living in Waterbury, and knew the
Cargills, testified that he made a pair of innovative steels as a young man of
eighteen in 1865, and gave them to Miss Jennie McNulty to wear. Miss
McNulty sewed the steels into her corsets, and reportedly continued to wear
them until her corsets wore out.252 Fitzpatrick described a similar scene to the
one Frances had described: "I was down to her house, and she was taking out a
broken pair out of her corsets, and I gave her [the newly invented pair] to put
in; she got them in and sewed them up." 253  Like Samuel, Fitzpatrick later
married the recipient of his steels.2 54  Samuel's behavior was evidently not
particularly unusual. What distinguished Samuel from William Cargill and
247. For a recent discussion of the relationship between Married Women's Property Acts and
coverture, see KATHLEEN S. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: WOMEN AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2007). The doctrine with respect to female inventors is discussed
in PILATO, supra note 26, at 7-8, and Khan, supra note 90.
248. There is no indication as to why counsel did not draw upon this evidence. It is possible that
this type of behavior was so common that counsel did not feel the need to belabor the point. This
speculation is supported by the failure of the appellees to concentrate on Frances's use as evidence of
invalidity, an indication that they too felt that Judge Blatchford was misguided in his reasoning, if not in
the outcome of his decision. Or it may be that counsel did not want to draw attention to the fact that
Cargill and Fitzpatrick moved much more rapidly to file a patent application than had Samuel.
249. Transcript of Deposition of Jeanette Cargill, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 131;
Transcript of Deposition of William B. Cargill, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 135.
250. Transcript of Deposition of Jeanette Cargill, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 131.
251. Id. at 131-32; Transcript of Deposition of William B. Cargill, in Transcript of Record, supra
note 54, at 136.
252. Transcript of Deposition of John L. Fitzpatrick, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 143,
145.
253. Id. at 146.
254. Id. at 143.
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Fitzpatrick was Frances's later patent infringement suits. There are no reported
cases in which the Cargill or Fitzpatrick patents were litigated.25 5
Despite the extensive efforts on the part of Frances's counsel to cast
Frances's use as a "mere experimental private use" and to remind the Court of
the traditional strong evidence of abandonment required to invoke the public
use bar, the Supreme Court largely followed Blatchford's line of reasoning.
Disregarding the failure of the defendants both in the Circuit Court and in their
Supreme Court brief to rely on what they evidently felt was the slim reed of
Frances's testimony, Justice Woods chose to portray the defendants' case as
"mainly" based on prior public use by Frances. 2 56 The attempt by Frances's
counsel to frame such an argument as outside the pleadings and as an
unsupported venture of Judge Blatchford went unheeded. Further, the Supreme
Court went beyond Blatchford in forging new ground in the case, dropping any
reliance on Mrs. Bower's use or the display to Sturges. By relying solely on
Frances's use, the Court interpreted the statutory bar based on public use as
broadly as possible, making it easy for inventors to lose the ability to patent
otherwise patentable inventions.
The Court began by reiterating that the use of only one article could
constitute public use, based on previous cases and using the examples of a
large, expensive object such as a mower, a printing press, and a railway car,
manufactured and sold by the inventor to a commercial establishment.257
Further, the Court went on, without any citations to earlier case law,
determining whether the use of an invention is public or private "does not
necessarily depend on the number of persons to whom its use is known.,,258
The operative issue is whether the recipient takes the invention subject to any
sort of "limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy."259 This
pronouncement changed the emphasis from substance to form. The
confidentiality needed to be explicitly requested-an inventor could not simply
rely on actual lack of public knowledge. Finally, Justice Wood argued that the
hidden nature of an invention which by its "very character" is "only capable of
being used where [it] cannot be seen or observed by the public eye" is also not
determinative of the public or private nature of use.260 Just as open use could
fail to be public use, such as the experimental use in City of Elizabeth, hidden
use could be public use. The Court used the example of a spring or gear within
a machine. "[I]f its inventor sells a machine of which his invention forms a
part, and allows it to be used without restriction of any kind, the use is a public
255. It is possible that either patent was litigated in one or more cases that did not result in a
published opinion.
256. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 335 (1881).
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one,"261 the majority concluded. Based on this explanation of the law, the
Court concluded that Frances's use alone was sufficient to raise a statutory bar
of public use, without any need to consider the use by Mrs. Bower, or the
display to Sturges. In the cases it cited, and in this summary sentence, the
Court consistently discussed Frances's use without considering the transfer of
the steels to Frances as a non-pecuniary gift. The opinion was written as if
Samuel had sold her a single copy of his invention.
PART V. PATENT TROLLS AND TROLLOPS
This "as if' assumption allowed the Court to ignore aspects of the facts
related to gender and sexuality. If the transfer was a simple sale, it was not
legally significant-as Frances's counsel had argued-that Samuel, a man,
needed a woman to try out his invention. Nor did it matter that Frances and
Samuel were "intimate friends." By considering the transfer to Frances as if it
were a sale, the Court shifted not just Frances's corset, but the entire
relationship between the future husband and wife, to the public, commercial
realm. From this assumption, the Court considered what Frances "might have"
done. "She might have exhibited [the steels] to any person, or made other
steels of the same kind, and used or sold them. ... 262 In this characterization
of Frances's possible actions, the Court treated her as a businessperson. It
flatly ignored, not just the facts of the case before it, but also the understanding
of the gendered public/private divide maintained by the ideology of separate
spheres.
The Court's analysis, by considering Frances free to exhibit, manufacture,
or sell the steels, placed Frances, wearing her corset, firmly within the public
realm of commerce, a place where many nineteenth-century American women
worked in order to support themselves and their families, but a realm that was
considered ideally a masculine preserve.263 Considering Frances's wearing of
the steels as "public use" placed her in that masculine public sphere, despite the
lack of any evidence that she was engaged in commerce related to the steels
during the period in question-the eleven years before Samuel's death. It was
only after his death that she began to commercially exploit the patent and go
into business. The Court, however, chose to focus on what she might have
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881).
263. Working class and enslaved women have always worked for their livelihoods in the United
States. The doctrine of separate spheres was an ideology that shaped the choices of American men and
women of all classes (most obviously, but not exclusively, in the types of work available for and wages
offered to women), but did not describe the reality of lived experience of many. For a discussion of the
influx of middle-class women into workplaces during the nineteenth century, and the constant tension
their employment caused because of the social ideal of the public sphere as masculine, see CINDY
SONDIK ARON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE: MIDDLE-CLASS WORKERS IN
VICTORIAN AMERICA (1987).
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done, in the absence of a legally binding confidentiality agreement, rather than
what she did. Its reasoning reversed the presumptions of the separate spheres
ideology. Instead of assuming that Frances, as a corset-wearing woman,
conducted her life within the private sphere, and relied on men's work within
the public sphere to support her, it assumed without requiring any supporting
facts that Frances wore and used the corset in public ways. This reasoning not
only appeared to violate the ideology of separate spheres, but was contrary to
prior understandings of the public use doctrine in patent law as a difficult-to-
trigger standard requiring a showing of financial gain and actual public
knowledge, making it seem odd even at the time.
The Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, called upon to apply
the public use doctrine in a patent litigation after the ruling of the New York
Circuit Court in Egbert, but before the Supreme Court ruled, called the decision
"remarkable" in an opinion that refused to follow Judge Blatchford's expansive
reading of the public use doctrine.264 The Massachusetts judge reiterated his
understanding of the law of public use as substantive, not formal, requiring "not
only a use by the public, but a use in public, that is to say, one which is not
secret, and therefore, one from which, so far as the inventor is concerned, the
public may, by any of the chances of life, acquire the knowledge."265 But it was
the dissenting Supreme Court Justice Miller, who put the matter most bluntly in
disagreeing with the newly reconfigured public use doctrine crafted by the
Egbert majority:
If the little steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by
only one woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position
always withheld from public observation, is a public use of that piece
of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a private and a public
use.266
Given that the corset itself was such a powerful enforcer of the
public/private divide between feminine and masculine spheres of activity and
influence, able to speak in courtrooms to that divide, what led the majority to
blatantly transgress this ideology in a corset case? The answer lies in the
multiple ways of knowing about corsets, gender, and sexuality in law and
society.
There is a strong hint that the majority was motivated by a suspicion that
Samuel had acted unfairly in delaying his application, even though the record
failed to show that he had obtained any actual benefit by his delay, and
although the articulated legal test did not include any consideration of the
264. Manning v. Cape Ann Isinglass & Glue Co., 16 F. Cas. 643, 644 (1879) (involving use of a
method of cooling scrapers in a factory).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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patentee's motive. Reviewing the evidence collected by the defendants about
other corset steels, the Court concluded that by the time of Samuel's patent
application in 1866, "the principle of his device was almost universally used in
the manufacture of corset-steels. It is fair to presume that having learned from
this general use that there was some value in his invention, he attempted to
resume, by his application, what by his acts he had clearly dedicated to the
public." 26 7 Today, such actions might be pejoratively termed "trollery"-as
Samuel could be portrayed as not simply passively sleeping on his rights, but
instead waiting to bear the costs of patenting until he could be sure of rich
license fees from an industry which had settled on double steels as the best
technology for stiff, front-opening corsets. 2 68
With a more expansive understanding of the facts of the case, and of
Frances's history as the patent-owner, this motivation for the decision can be
seen as reflecting the gender assumptions of the Court, at work even as the
Justices surprisingly placed Frances in the public realm. The Court assumed
that Samuel as a male inventor was commercially savvy and economically
rational in his actions. There is no indication in the record, however, that
Samuel felt that his invention had increased in commercial worth during the
1850s, or that he paid particular attention to developments in corset technology.
Rather, he appears to have been an underemployed, dreamy tinkerer, with many
unrelated ideas, and no personal or financial resources to realize any of them.269
It was Frances, as a consumer of corsets, who testified that she had owned
270
multiple pairs during the decade in question, and she who was in a position
to appreciate the value of Samuel's invention. Her estimation may have
motivated her marriage, after eight years' intimacy, to a man she described as
poor, sick, and depressed. It was after the marriage that Samuel decided to test
the steels on a "very stout lady." It may well have been at Frances's initiative
that he did so, and also at her urging that he finally "nerved himself' to patent
the invention three years after their marriage. Less than two months after
receiving the patent, Samuel was dead, leaving a written will despite his
267. Id. at 337.
268. The contemporary term patent "troll" is sufficiently controversial and malleable that many
scholars prefer not to use it, but it persists as shorthand pejorative for those perceived as unfairly
wielding patents. For a recent discussion of the "troll" term see, for example, Robert P. Merges, The
Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583,
1586-87 (2009). For previous uses of the term ahistorically to refer to debates of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, see JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS: A POPULIST
VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008).
269. Samuel is thereby distinguished from Cargill and Fitzpatrick, each of whom were familiar
with corset steel manufacture at the time of their innovation. Cargill received three patents in rapid
succession in 1868 for improvements in corset clasps (none of which was for a strengthened steel): U.S.
Patent No. 73,873 (issued Jan. 28, 1868), U.S. Patent No. 75,856 (issued Mar. 24, 1868), and U.S.
Patent No. 78,056 (issued May 19, 1868). Fitzpatrick patented a form of doubled corset steel in 1869:
U.S. Patent No. 96,685 (issued Nov. 9, 1869).
270. Transcript of Deposition of Frances Egbert, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 17.
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apparent lack of worldly goods, and Frances moved quickly to go into business
and to maximize the value of his estate.
Frances showed every sign of being a savvy businesswoman both before
and after her re-marriage to Wesley Egbert in 1870. Ironically, while there was
no evidence that Frances moved to exploit Samuel's invention or to reveal it to
the public in any way before he filed his application, after his death, she
brought her corseted self firmly into the public sphere, engaging in all the
activities which the Court suggested she might have earlier-exhibiting the
steels, making others, and selling them. After eleven years of merely
experiencing the private benefit of durable corset steels, by the time she
testified as a litigant, she was using her commercial exploitation of Samuel's
steels to support herself and her new husband. In 1881, Frances, as a
businesswoman, was unquestionably engaged in the public use of Samuel's
steels, while between 1855 and 1863, she had kept them, as far as the record
reveals, as an undisclosed element of her personal wardrobe. The Supreme
Court's opinion thus involved a temporal sleight of hand, shifting Frances and
her corset nunc pro tunc, and also a transposition of Frances's ambition (a
masculine trait with no place in the private feminine sphere of home and
hearth) to the hapless Samuel.
The Court may have suspected that Samuel was acting as a troll, but the
previous case law had suggested that inventors should be given the benefit of
the doubt. Using a feminist lens to identify the multiple knowledges of the
nineteenth-century corset and the gendered and hierarchical nature of any
public/private distinction allows us to develop a deeper explanation of the
Court's construction of public use. In seeking to understand why the Court
failed to give the benefit of the doubt to the savvy Frances and her corset, it is
helpful to apply McGaw's admonition to consider both women and their
experiences, and feminine domains. In Parts II and III, we followed the corset,
but in considering Egbert as a case study, we have also been following Frances
as a woman. Following the corset, we have learned that Frances was not
unique as a female business owner and patentee in corset manufacture, but in
the facts of Egbert, she becomes unique as a woman who made a transition
from an intimate friend of the inventor, who wore his personal gift of a
reinforced pair of corset steels, to a manufacturer of corset steels and enforcer
of the Barnes patent. It was Frances's actions in the public sphere that
distinguished her from Miss Dolittle and Miss McNulty, who also accepted
innovative corset steels as gifts from male inventors. Frances remains singular
as a donee who became a patent owner and litigator. This transition moved
Frances from a relationship in which male and female actions could be
understood through the prevailing gender ideology of the time, into a role in
which she acted in the public sphere directly, without the mediation of a man,
and in unspoken defiance of the separate spheres ideology.
2011] 111
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
As we saw in Cohn, the corset itself carried gendered knowledge into
American courtrooms, but Frances also had agency in her deployment of
gender norms. Like the other women in the Victorian period involved in corset
patents, manufacture, and litigation, Frances chose when to embrace gender
ideology, and when, as countless other women had when earning their living, to
ignore it. The staging of Frances's deposition in her home, a private space,
with Frances lying in bed as a self-proclaimed invalid, showed that Frances and
her lawyer, like the judiciary, were fully aware of the ideology, and could
deploy it strategically. Her very decision to wear a corset regularly through the
1850s and 1860s, keeping Samuel's invention in use, was a decision to enact
respectable femininity, regardless of any simultaneous sexual relationship with
a man not her husband. Even the reported presence of Miss Cregier during the
conversation about breaking corset steels was testimony that the encounter
between the unmarried Frances and Samuel was chaperoned.
Like many, if not all, Victorians, Frances during the course of her life
situated herself in apparently contradictory ways with respect to the ideology of
separate spheres. Within a world organized to support patriarchal dominance,
she found room to maneuver as a woman seeking power over her own
economic destiny. She was a retiring female, more comfortable in her home
than in a lawyer's office, and she was a business partner of George Cruttenden,
with her own office.271 Her sexuality was controlled and contained by a corset,
and she was "intimate friends" with Samuel. These contradictions had worked
well for her.
By the time of the Supreme Court's decision in December 1881, three
years after the case was appealed, Samuel's patent had only about eighteen
months to run on its original seventeen-year term. So while Frances may have
had reason to regret Samuel's failure to specify that her use of the steels in
1855 was confidential and/or for experimental purposes, she had been able to
use her inheritance for fifteen years as the basis for an apparently successful
business. 27 2 She had forged alliances with a business partner, hired well-known
counsel, and litigated successfully in the federal courts, all to support her corset
steel business, and to obtain license fees from Samuel's patent. She both wore
corsets and profited by them.
In her final court case, however, these contradictions became a liability.
The corset she wore, and its significance in her relationship with Samuel,
carried different knowledge than the corsets she alleged Lippmann and
Seligmann sold in violation of Samuel's patent. There were multiple ways of
271. Transcript of Deposition of Alexander Mayer, in Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 25
(testifying that he first met Frances at her "business office").
272. 1 base my characterization of Frances's business as successful by her ability to pay fees for the
five patent reissues (which cost $30 a piece plus legal expenses) and for leading attorneys to litigate her
cases, and her certification in support of her appeal bond that she was worth at least $1000 beyond her
debts. Transcript of Record, supra note 54, at 256.
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knowing corsets and Frances before the Court, and it had to choose a way of
aligning the public/private divide in patent law with existing gendered
understandings of both the public/private divide and of the corset.
By 1881, the American legal system had already decided upon a clear set
of meanings for the relationship between a particular corset and one woman's
body. The use in question in Egbert began as Samuel was involved in a
conversation with two women, neither any relation to him, about their corsets.
By discussing her corset with Samuel, Frances created evidence that she was
not respectable, but perhaps, a trollop. She then strengthened this evidentiary
presumption by accepting a corset-related gift from Samuel-a new steel that
he suggested would solve her problem of breaking corsets. Her personal corset
was a witness, creating an unrebutted presumption of a sexual relationship
273between her and Samuel. 2 If Frances and Samuel were sexual partners, the
idea that Samuel should have sought a non-disclosure agreement from Frances
seems ludicrous. As the dissent noted: "It may be well imagined that a
prohibition to [Frances] . . . against exposing her use of the steel spring to
public observation would have been supposed to be a piece of irony." 2 74 The
irony arose because a sexual relationship was private, distinct from the public
commercial realm of arms' length transactions in which a confidentiality
agreement might be used. A man need not get his lover to sign an agreement
that she would not show her undergarments to anyone else; his exclusive right
275to view those undergarments was an assumption of their private relationship.
And if the relationship was private, then was the use of the steel not also
private, and therefore unable to trigger the statutory bar?
This is the logical result of considering Frances's corset as a witness, based
on multiple cases in which the corset testified as to a man's sexual access to the
female body wearing the corset. Yet those cases involved socially sanctioned
reasons to recognize non-marital sexual relationships-the avoidance of
support payments by a cuckolded husband, the assignment of support
obligations to a ne'er-do-well seducer, and the condemnation of adultery. In
Egbert, there were no such questions of family law and order at stake. By the
273. Their actual relationship remains unknowable. There is the possibility that the sexual
relationship between Frances and Samuel was a commercial one, that is, that Frances was a full-time or
casual prostitute, or Samuel's financially supported mistress. It is also possible that from 1855 to 1863,
she was legally married to someone else (Mr. Lee, perhaps), but that they were living separately. There
is no evidence in the record that supports or rejects either possibility. If we compare Samuel's actions to
that of Fitzpatrick and Cargill, we note that Fitzpatrick also was apparently on a path to marriage with
Miss McNulty, indicating some intimacy in their relationship, and that Cargill was already married when
he gave his son's steels to Miss Dolittle, which he did in the presence of Mrs. Cargill, perhaps to rebut
any suggestion of extramarital intimacy with an unmarried woman living in his house. See supra text
accompanying notes 249-254.
274. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 339 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting).
275. Note that there is no indication that either Cargill or Fitzpatrick sought a commitment from
their donees to keep the novel corset steel secret, despite the apparent intention of each man to patent his
invention.
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time Frances was litigating her case, she was married to Wesley Egbert, and
was a self-supporting businesswoman. And, as the Court noted, she was
seeking to monopolize a now-common element of a ubiquitous technology.
The circular published after the disposition of the Castle litigation showed the
breadth of Frances's claim: at least in the New York metropolitan area, she
asserted ownership of any reinforced steel. This claim, if sustained, might have
required all corset manufacturers to pay her license fees. To recognize the
relationship of Frances and Samuel in 1855 as intimate, and therefore to
understand Frances's acceptance and use of the steels as private, would have
rewarded the couple for the socially unacceptable behavior of an extramarital
sexual relationship by allowing Frances, two decades later, to control a leading
technology. The femininity and sexuality of Frances's personal corset thereby
came into conflict with the masculinity of the thousands of corsets being made
and manufactured in the United States, simply another form of patented
technology. Following this logic, Frances would be rewarded for being a
trollop by being allowed to act like a troll.
Instead, the Court chose to consider Frances's own corset from the
perspective of masculine technology, as if it were a spring or cog, simply
another widget made and used by men. Her personal corset was merely one
example of the corset as patented technology, a commercial product rather than
an intimate garment. Her discussion with Samuel was like a conversation
between two interested parties about a new cog for a mower. By choosing to
recognize only the masculine valence of the corset as patented technology, the
majority could reasonably treat Frances as a business associate, even a potential
business competitor. Letting another businessperson use a potentially valuable
invention in a technological area about which the user had significant expertise,
without any restrictions, might easily be considered abandonment of the
invention to the public.
By the time Frances was deposed in 1875, she was firmly within the public
sphere when it came to her use of Samuel's invention, as a businesswoman and
patent owner, circulating corset steels in commerce. Her counsel made two
determined efforts to emphasize the femininity of Frances and her corset, rather
than the masculinity of her business ventures and of the corset steels she
manufactured: first, in insisting that Frances be deposed in the domestic,
private space of her home, and second, by arguing that Frances, as Samuel's
future wife, should have been able to wear the steels for as long as she liked as
a private use. These efforts failed, not because the Court was unaware of the
feminine valence of the corset, and the witness it gave, but precisely because it
was aware of these ways of knowing the corset. Recall Justice Woods's
phrasing of Samuel's fatal mistake: "The inventor slept on his rights for eleven
years."
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The Court needed to ignore Frances's femininity in order to avoid using
patent law to sanction her extralegal sexual activities. The choice ultimately
came down to considering one woman's underwear public, or acknowledging
and rewarding a sexual intimacy of many years standing between two
unmarried people. As Victorian gentlemen, the Justices knew femininity when
it was referenced by the shorthand terms of "grace" and "elegance." They also
considered the law, even patent law, as appropriately recognizing and
reinforcing the natural "spheres and destinies" of man and woman,276 which did
not include elevating a trollop to Supreme Court-approved patent troll.
Frances's intimate relationship with Samuel may have led to their marriage,
and to her control of the patent as his widow, but like many women before and
since, Frances found her sexuality to be a double-edged sword. The dual nature
of the corset in public and private, and the meanings it thus carried, worked
together to motivate the Court's ruling against Frances.
Subjected to a feminist analysis, the Egbert case no longer appears odd. It
was not about a male inventor sleeping on his rights, but about a woman
marshalling her varied resources in the best ways she could within a
constraining ideology of gender, maintaining a grip on her own femininity as
she both wore and profited from corsets as patented technology. And from this
analysis, we can answer the question Dan Burk recently raised: "What might a
gendered patent or gendered patent system look like?" 27 7 It looks like the
patent system we have. The patent system is not a gender-free zone of
technology, but involves carefully negotiated knowledges about gender that are
exposed when the masculine category of technology is claimed for a
profoundly femininized item, such as a corset. The decision in Egbert about
the public use doctrine arose out of judicial understanding of the gendered
nature of the public/private divide in American life. Having revealed Egbert,
the foundational case for the public use doctrine, as inextricably bound to
matters of gender and sexuality, we can begin to see the way that patents have
been gendered, and to appreciate that patent law, like other areas of law
explored through a feminist lens, is not a realm set apart, but is part of the
gendered society in which inventors, examiners, judges, attorneys, and
witnesses all live and act. Getting a grip on the corset gives us a grip on
gender, helping to make visible the previously invisible.
276. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
277. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, supra note 19, at 3.
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